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i. The Problem 
 
The European human rights regime is currently defined by the entanglement of two 
formerly parallel institutions. First, the Council of Europe’s European Convention of Human 
Rights, which sets out the legal rights of individual Europeans. Second, the European Union’s 
Charter of Fundamental Freedoms, which also sets out the legal rights of European individuals. 
The Council of Europe was founded in 1948 as an intergovernmental organization— a 
regional United Nations (“UN”) without a Security Council. Its primary function since then has 
been the protection of human rights through its judicial organ, the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECtHR”).   
The European Union was founded out of the European Communities in 1993 as a 
supranational government with limited competences— its members must be party to the 
European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”). Since 1951, the Courts of the European 
Communities1 only had authority over areas directly related to the economic integration of 
European states. As of December 2009 the Lisbon Treaty extended the Union’s limited 
competences to the protection of the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms. 
These formerly parallel institutions have now grown into each other. The Council’s 
judicial organ (the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights) and the Union’s 
judiciary (symbolically manifest in the Luxembourg-based European Court of Justice) have a 
potentially serious jurisdictional conflict in and over European Union member states.  
This paper seeks to establish what the Courts are and what they do in the eyes of their 
constitutive parts (the individual, the state, and the institution), identifying the nuances of the 
problem as perceived by the actors who engage it. It then identifies alternative developmental 
                                                 
1 Represented in this paper as its highest court, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”). 
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paths, and predicts the most likely outcome. To do this, this paper employs ideas from Ian 
Hurd’s and Alexander Wendt’s theories of legitimacy and anarchy in the international system.2 
Their constructivist visions focus on how actors address each other during problem-solving 
activities. How this interaction occurs, they argue, fundamentally informs the outcome of the 
problem solving. This paper, therefore, places itself as a regional application of the constructivist 
theory. 
 
ii.  Methodology 
 
Hurd and Wendt explore how actors identify and pursue interests by wielding symbols in 
the international system.3 The international system is the collection of actors who engage 
individuals, states, and institutions that hold some form of sovereign authority. Sovereign 
authority originally derived from a medieval political application of theology, and is the ability 
to hold final authority over a geographic area in the control of a singularly interested actor.4 
Actors identify their interests, Hurd and Wendt argue, through complex interactions with their 
external realities constrained by perceived social norms. Since actors are constantly interacting 
with the international system as they perceive it, there exists a feedback loop where actions and 
reactions change an actor’s perceptions. Therefore to identify how an actor perceives and pursues 
its interest, one is necessarily trying to hit a moving target. 
                                                 
2 Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics” International 
Organization 46, 2, Spring 1992. pp 391-425; Hurd, Ian. After Anarchy: Legitimacy & Power in the United Nations 
Security Council. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
3 In this paper, the term “Interest” is used interchangeably with “interest structure.”  I use both terms to describe the 
internal set of outcomes that an actor first organizes along a good/bad dichotomy and secondly organizes by level of 
preference. When an actor “rationally pursues its interests” I mean to say an actor “pursues those positive outcomes 
which it prefers over other positive outcomes.” What the first lacks phrase lacks in explicit accuracy it makes up in 
brevity. 
4 Kantorowicz, Ernst Hartwig. The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press 1957) 
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Ian Hurd identifies a moving object with which he can hit the moving target. Hurd’s 
analysis of the UN Security Council rests on the examination of actors’ usage of symbols. For 
Hurd, actors express their perceptions of the international system when they wield symbols to 
coerce another actor. Since symbols are subjective representations of an idea, their usage 
identifiably adjusts with the feedback loop. The identification of a rationally deducible logic for 
an actor’s usage of a symbol in the context of its usage also identifies the premises on which the 
logic rests. These premises are the fundamental aspects of how a state perceives the ontological 
reality of a situation.  
Symbols, as subjective representations of an idea, are open to changing definitions 
according to their usage. By using a symbol an actor attempts to invoke the set of principles that 
the actor perceives accompany it. However, actors can interpret or define a symbol differently. 
When actors differ over a symbol’s definition, a conflict between the definitions arises and the 
symbol evolves. Either one definition becomes accepted and the others fall by the wayside, or a 
new definition is created. Depending on what actors agree to use at a given moment, the symbol 
collects the various perceptions of actors either in conflict or in consensus.  
Thus, by identifying the conflict or consensus of a symbols’ definition at a given 
moment, one can also identify the premises that presuppose an actors’ symbol usage. Having 
gathered the assumptions of various actors, we can then draw conclusions on how these 
perceptions of reality interact. 
Hurd provides an example of this analytical method when he examines the usage of the 
UN’s light-blue and white insignia by national troops during UN peacekeeping operations. Hurd 
shows that this symbol functionally legitimates the troops’ role as peace-keeping members of the 
international community. Without it, operations labeled as peace-keeping missions lack the 
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symbols’ socialized meaning and are not believed by other states. In applying the UN’s insignia 
to helmets and vehicles, he argues, a state relates its troops’ presence in a different territory to 
the UN’s international community. According to Hurd a state usually conceivably does this to 
justify their troops’ presence in a different state for the sake of their individual troops’ safety and 
for the sake of the states’ international image as a team-player. However the usage is justified 
within the state it nonetheless presupposes that invoking the UN’s insignia provides legitimacy 
for the acting state. Hurd argues that the definition of the UN’s symbol is built by an existing 
social consensus among all relevant actors.5 
This method for analysis turns on the assumption that an actor will actively and rationally 
pursue the outcome which best aligns with its identifiable interest structures. Interest structures, 
are the set of identities that an actor perceives to hold normative value. What an actor defines as 
‘good’ holds normative value, whereas an action, situation, other agent that an actor defines as 
‘bad’ does not. The level of complexity differentiates an actor’s ‘interest structure’ and an actor’s 
‘interests.’ An actor’s ‘interests’ imply an immutable set of identities that are exogenously given 
by the actor’s nature. An actor’s interest structure is instead the combination of an actor’s nature 
and its experience. It describes the relationship between an actor’s inherent interests to an actor’s 
changing interests— what they assume versus what they learn. Thus, the rational pursuit of one’s 
interest structure implies that an actor takes action when it perceives an action’s necessity to 
realize its internal value structures.  
For example, if the US wants to protect the international peace and status quo, and 
perceives that the only way to do this is to by any means disallow Iraq from invading Kuwait, the 
US will wage war in the short term to achieve its policy objectives. Assuming that sending 
                                                 
5 Hurd. pp 124-128 
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domestic troops to a foreign land to wage a foreign war is not in the US leaders’ domestic 
interests, the relationship of the two interests motivates the actor’s actions. 
 
iii.  The Paper Structure 
 
This paper compares regional actors’ usages of symbols during the two fundamental life 
stages of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) and the European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ”). The first stage identifies how interested actors collectively define a court’s purpose (its 
perceived telos) during the time leading up to a court’s constitution. This analytic process 
‘identifies what the courts are.’ The second stage identifies how interested actors collectively 
defined the courts’ telos during its functioning. This analytic process ‘identifies what the courts 
do.’ Each stage of analysis identifies the actors involved and how they used relevant symbols to 
interact. The actors this paper studies are the individual, the state, and the institution. 
This paper proceeds in four chapters. The first chapter defines the institutions and 
justifies the paper’s theoretical approach. The second chapter is a case study of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) and the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). 
The third chapter is a case study of the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms (“the Charter”) and the 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”). The final chapter analyzes the relationships of these two 
institutions relative to their actors.  
Chapter I first organizes the Council of Europe and the European Union as regional 
structures. The chapter then justifies the study of regional international courts and this paper’s 
usage of constructivism. 
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Chapter II relates what the ECtHR is (its constitutive telos) to what it does (its functional 
telos) in two stages. The first stage inspects the progression of symbolic conflict between states 
during the deliberations in the Council of Europe on the European Convention of Human Rights. 
The first stage finds that states conflicted over the relationship of the Council of Europe to the 
UN, the limitations of protectable individual rights, and the enforcement mechanism to protect 
these rights. It shows that internal conflict persisted until member states found consensus through 
the conflict in the UN between the European regional identity and the global identity of the need 
for individual right protection.  
The second stage of chapter II analyzes the Courts’ jurisprudence concerning the margin 
of appreciation doctrine and its proportionality tests. These principles are the symbols that the 
Court uses to define its jurisdiction in the face of a member state’s jurisdictional challenge. The 
second stage shows that the ECtHR initially interpreted these principles broadly to defer to 
states, but has since then gradually narrowed its interpretation. The second chapter then 
concludes by identifying the relationships between these stages, and what the ECtHR is today for 
European individuals, states, and institutions. 
Chapter III relates what the ECJ is to what it does in two stages. The first stage analyzes 
the supremacy6 and the direct effect doctrines in ECJ jurisprudence. The Court uses these 
doctrines to communicate its role in vis à vis member state jurisdictional challenges. This stage 
concludes that the ECJ has categorically refused to defer to the legal jurisdictions of member 
states. Rather, it subverts member state court systems and expands its jurisdictions to the extent 
of the Community’s competences.  
The second stage of chapter III examines how non-state actors used the symbols of socio-
economic rights and enforcement mechanisms in the creation of the Charter of Fundament 
                                                 
6 Called elsewhere the ‘primacy principle’ 
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Freedoms’ intergovernmental conference. This stage shows firstly that more actors affected the 
Charter’s constitution than the ECHR’s constitutional process. It shows secondly that processes 
of regional identity-formation built a consensus that the Charter would protect rights greater than 
or equal to those in the ECHR, and that the ECJ would enforce these rights. The third chapter 
concludes by identifying the relationships between these stages, and what the ECJ is today for 
European individuals, states, and institutions. 
Chapter IV relates the findings of the second and third chapters to compare the Courts 
and the nature of their jurisdiction in the eyes of individuals, member states, and the other Court. 
It then identifies potential solutions to the jurisdictional problem, and predicts the most likely 
outcome— 
The European Union will, as an institution, use its new international legal personality to 
accede to the ECHR and become subject to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction. The ECJ will construct a 
symbol to define a monist hierarchy of human rights jurisdictions ascending from EU member 
states to the ECJ and then to the ECtHR. The ECJ will maintain its position as the head of a 
monist hierarchy in those areas of community law where the ECtHR does not have jurisdiction. 
In doing so, the EU may help the ECtHR legitimately expand the rights protected by the ECHR. 
However, this potential expansion of rights in the ECHR area depends on the reactions of the 





Chapter I. Definitions and theory 
This chapter defines the relevant institutions and justifies the paper’s theoretical approach. 
The first section organizes for the reader the institutional structures of the Council of Europe and 
European Union. The second section defends the usage of international courts in a regional case 
study. To conclude the chapter, the third section defends the usage of constructivism to study the 
courts.  
i. The European regional political institutions 
 
Diagram 1. The European Regional Political Structure (April 2010).7 
 
                                                 
7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Supranational_European_Bodies (n.b. The diagram has been fact-checked) 
The European Free Trade Association, founded in 1960, is an association of states committed to free trade 
principles. The Schengen Area are states who share border control policies and allow freedom of movement between 
states internally. The European Economic Area allows for free trade between EFTA states and the EU. The 
Eurozone are those states who use the Euro as their national currency. The EU Customs Union allows for free trade 
between EU member States and potential members and controls external custom rates.  
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This section provides a brief overview of how the Council of Europe and the European 
Union are organized and introduces their relevant actors, terminology, and processes.8 It portrays 
the institutional structures, the interrelationship of their organs, the day-to-day functions, and 
relevant historical trends.9 (See Diagram 1). 
The subsection on the Council of Europe describes the Council’s organs, the Council’s 
procedures, and then surveys its notable achievements.  
The subsection on the European Union describes the history of its treaties and its 
membership. It then describes the Communities’ institutional structure and legislative process. It 
concludes by clarifying a common conceptual problem regarding the Union’s development. 
                                                 
8 The sources these sections are primarily based on: Hix, Simon. The Political System of the European Union. The 
European Union Series, 2nd ed. (New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); McCormick, John. 
Understanding the European Union. The European Union Series (New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002); and Nugent, Neil. The Government and Politics of the European Union 6th ed. The European Union Series 
(New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
9 The European Union has led to a great deal of scholarship focused on how regional constitutional processes 
function. See, for example, Ansell, Christopher K. and Giuseppe Di Palma, eds. Restructuring Territoriality: Europe 
and the United States Compared. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Baimbridge, Mark, Brian Burkitt 
and Philip Whyman, eds. The Impact of the Euro. (New York, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Christiansen, 
Thomas and Christine Reh, Constitutionalizing the European Union (New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009); Chryssochoou, Dimitris N. Theorizing European Integration. (New York, New York: Routledge, 2009); 
Eriksen, Erik Oddvar and John Erik Fossum “Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation Assessed” 
International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 
435-459 Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601608; MacCormick, Neil, “Democracy, Subsidiarity, and 
Citizenship in the European Commonwealth”; Meehan, Elizabeth M. “European Integration and Citizens' Rights: A 
Comparative Perspective” Publius, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Autumn, 1996), pp. 99-121 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330773; 
Menéndez-Alarcón, Antonio. The Cultural Realm of European Integration: Social Representations in France, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom. (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2004); Schäffner, Christina, Andreas 
Musolff, and Michael Townson. “Diversity and Unity in European Debates” in Conceiving of Europe: Diversity in 
Unity (Brookfield, Vermont: Dartmouth University Press, 1996); Stone Sweet, Alec. The Judicial Construction of 
Europe (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004); and Szczerbiak, Aleks and Paul Taggart. Opposing 
Europe?: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Volumes I and II. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000); Weber, Katja, Michael E. Smith, and Michael Baun, eds. Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood: Partners or 




Diagram 2. The Council of Europe’s Membership10 
 
A. The Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights 
The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental political forum for human rights. It 
mainly discusses, expands, and enforces the European Convention of Human Rights. This 
section first surveys the membership and organizational structure of the Council of Europe, and 
then outlines historical trends. 
The Treaty of London (also known as The Statute of the Council of Europe) founded the 
Council of Europe in 1949. Originally, the Council’s membership included only ten states: 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. Today, the Council consists of 47 member states. Several Non-European 
states observe its proceedings (Mexico, Japan, Canada, the U.S., and the Vatican). Every 
                                                 




member state of the European Union is also a member of the Council of Europe, but not all 
members of the Council of Europe belong to the European Union.  
The Council of Europe is organized into the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary 
Assembly,11 the Congress of the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, the 
Commission for Human Rights, and the Conference of the INGOs.  
The Parliamentary Assembly elects a Secretary General to a five-year term and appoints 
the secretariat. The position was included in the original Treaty of London. The Secretary 
General oversees the day-to-day bureaucracy of the Council of Europe, and shapes general goals 
for the Council each year.12 
The Committee of Ministers was founded in the Treaty of London. In the two years 
following the Treaty of London, the Committee controlled the agenda of the Consultative 
Assembly. At that point, the Parliamentary Assembly was called the Consultative Assembly. In 
1951, the Committee passed an amendment to the Treaty that reserved this authority for the 
Assembly.13 Membership in the Committee of Ministers is technically reserved for the member 
states’ top foreign ministers. However, most members of the Committee are individuals whom 
the Council has accredited to represent member states’ foreign ministers. The Committee of 
Ministers now admits new member States, concludes conventions, gives recommendations to 
member states, adopts the budget, monitors the Council’s program of activity, and supervises the 
execution of the European Court of Human Rights’ judgments. It meets in Paris.14 
                                                 
11 The “Consultative Assembly” until 1994 




13 Amendments to the Statute of the Council of Europe. Accessed last 16 April 2010 at 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/001.htm#FN2  




The Parliamentary Assembly (“PACE”) comprises 321 national parliamentarians from 
member states, who are represented on the basis of population size. Each state selects its method 
to designate its Assembly representatives. The Assembly was founded in the Treaty of London 
as the Consultative Assembly. In 1951, after the Committee of Ministers passed the first 
amendment to the Statute of the Council of Europe, the Assembly could set its own agenda. The 
Parliament consults member states and the committee of ministers on regional issues, and can 
pass recommendations, resolutions and opinions. These are non-binding on member states, so the 
Assembly functions primarily as a political forum for human rights protection. The Assembly 
meets 4 times a year in Strasbourg.15  
The Congress of the Council of Europe was established in 1994 to represent local and 
regional authorities in the member states. It is composed in the same way as the Parliamentary 
Assembly. It is also primarily a political forum without any binding capabilities. It also meets in 
Strasbourg.16 
The European Court of Human Rights was established in 1950 by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Court and the Convention together have become the 
centerpiece of the Council of Europe’s activities. The Court comprises a judge from each 
member state elected by the Parliamentary Assembly. After the passage of Protocol 14 to the 
European Convention of Human Rights, judges serve a 9-year non-renewable term. Within the 
Court, judges are organized into five sections that are each led by a Section President. The Court 
as a whole elects the Court’s President and each Section President. Cases are heard either by a 
section’s chamber of 6 rotating judges plus the section president or the Courts’ grand chamber of 
                                                 
15 The Council of Europe “Pace in Brief” accessed last 16 April 2010 at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?Link=/AboutUs/APCE_structures.htm 




17 members. The grand chamber includes the President of the Court, the Section Presidents, and 
a rotating selection of justices from two judge pools which alternate every nine months. The 
grand chamber typically hears highly politicized cases. The Committee of Ministers is 
responsible for the enforcement of all Court decisions.17 
The Commissioner for Human Rights was established in 1999. The Parliamentary 
Assembly elects a Commissioner for a non-renewable six-year term. The Commissioner can 
contact governments of member states and issue recommendations, opinions and reports. The 
position acts primarily as a visible, political advocate for the protection of the ECHR’s human 
rights.18 
The Conference of INGOS was established in 2003 as a forum for dialogue between 
regional NGO’s recognized by the Committee of Ministers. Today, it consists of 400 NGOs. The 
Conference discusses contemporary issues with the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary 
Assembly and the Congress of the Council of Europe, but has no policy capabilities. It meets 
during the Parliamentary Assembly’s ordinary sessions in Strasbourg. 
The Council of Europe primarily ran the ECtHR and protected the individual human 
rights of European citizens for most of its existence. Its forums for political discussion 
fundamentally revolve around this purpose. The latest major achievement of the Council of 
Europe was the passage and revision of the European Social Charter on 18 October 196119 and 3 
May 1996.20 The Social Charter sets out the socio-economic rights of individuals in a non-
                                                 
17 Mowbray, Alastair. Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights. Second Edition (Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Ovey, Clare and  Robin C.A. White, Jacobs & White, The European 
Convention on Human Rights, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
18 The Council of Europe. “Overview of Activities.” Accessed last 17 April 2010 at 
http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/Activities/overview_en.asp 
19 The Council of Europe.  The European Social Charter (1961). Accessed last 2 May 2010 at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=035&CM=1&CL=ENG 




binding document. Therefore, the Council of Europe is primarily a meeting space for European 
states, individuals, and organizations. For the human rights regime, this means that the Council 
of Europe is a primary arena in which actors interact. These interactions are studied in Chapter 
II. 
 
B. The European Union and the European Court of Justice 
 
The European Union is a supranational government that operates by the consent of the 
governed with limited competences. Member States and their citizens delineate these 
competences by creating, signing, and incorporating into national law the Union’s founding 
treaties. These treaties are typically built by the Union’s organs, and then consented to and 
ratified by national governments, parliaments, and citizens. EU organs also use treaty provisions 
to create secondary laws that legitimately constrain member states.  
 
This section first describes the history of the Union through its treaty formation and the 
growth of its membership. It then surveys the Union’s institutional structures and legislative 
processes. It concludes by questioning the assumption that the Union’s deeper integration and 




Diagram 3. The Membership of the EU21 
i. The history of the European Union 
The institution that today is called the European Union (“EU”) began in 1952 as the 
European Coal and Steel Community (“ECSC”). The Treaty of Paris22 established this 
community for the stated purpose of integrating fundamental industries in Europe. The Treaties 
of Rome23 established in 1957 the European Economic Community (“EEC”) and the European 
                                                 
21 One World - Nations Online “Map of the European States” last modified: Thursday, 22 April 2010. Accessed last 
1 May 2010 http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/europe_map.htm.  
The legend reads: Yellow-EU member states; light orange-EU new members 2004; dark orange- EU new 
members 2007; pinkish orange- EU Candidates; green- EFTA member states 
n.b. the pink are states unrelated to the EU  
22 Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel community. 1952 Accessed last 2 May 2010 at www.ena.lu  
23 The Treaties of Rome, 1957 Accessed last 2 May 2010 at www.ena.lu 
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Atomic Energy Community (“EAEC” or “Euratom”). The Merger Treaty24 combined these 
institutions into the European Community (“EC”). In 1987, the Single European Act (“SEA”)25 
set the establishment by 1992 of a common European market as the EC’s primary goal. During 
the five years after SEA, the EC developed the three-pillar structure and established the 
European Union in 1992 with the passage of the Maastricht Treaty (also known as The Treaty on 
European Union “TEU”). 26 After the TEU, two treaties amended the EU’s procedural structure: 
the Treaty of Amsterdam (“Amsterdam”)27 in 1997 and the Treaty of Nice (“Nice” or the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union “TFEU”) in 2000. 28 The TEU, Amsterdam and Nice 
governed the EU until Lisbon entered into force in December 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon, 
however, was preceded by the Constitutional Treaty of 2004, which failed in Dutch and French 
referenda.29 The Constitutional Treaty included the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000. The 
Charter was a restatement of individual rights common to the region that would be enforceable 
by the ECJ. The Charter of Fundamental Rights did not enter into community law until the 
Lisbon Treaty.30The law included in the treaties is known collectively as the Union’s primary 
law. 
 
                                                 
24The Merger Treaty, 1967 (“Brussels’ Treaty”) Accessed last 2 May 2010 at www.ena.lu 
25 The Single European Act, 1987 (“SEA”) Accessed last 2 May 2010 at www.ena.lu 
26 Treaty on European Union, 1993. (“TEU”) Accessed last 2 May 2010 at www.ena.lu 
27 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, 1999. (“Amsterdam”) Accessed last 2 May 2010 at www.ena.lu 
28 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2003. (“TFEU” or “Nīce”) Accessed last 2 May 2010 at 
www.ena.lu 
29 For greater analysis on this, see Christiansen, Thomas and Christine Reh, Constitutionalizing the European Union 
(New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) and Eriksen, Erik Oddvar and John Erik Fossum “Europe in 
Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation Assessed” International Political Science Review / Revue 
internationale de science politique, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 435-459. Stable URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601608 
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Diagram 4. History of the Treaties31 
 
                                                 
31 Adapted from the wikipedia database. Accessed last 1 May 1, 2010 at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_European_Union_history  
Fact checked using Thorlakson, Lori. “Timeline of the European Union” at Oxford University Press online. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) Accessed 
last 1 May 2010 at  http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/eupolitics/resources/timeline/timeline_pdf.pdf  
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Membership in the European Coal and Steel Community included: France, Western 
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy. In 1973, the UK, Denmark, and 
Ireland joined the European Communities. Greece joined the communities in 1981; Spain and 
Portugal joined in 1986. Greenland, formerly a protectorate of Denmark, left the community in 
1985 and is the only state to have done so. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern Germany 
joined the communities in 1990. Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined in 1995. On 1 May 2004 
ten countries— the Czech Republic, Greek Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia— joined the Union, followed in 2007 by Bulgaria and Romania. 
These two expansions are colloquially referred together as the “Big-Bang” enlargements.32 
Today the EU consists of 27 nations.  
Iceland, Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia have opened applications to join the EU, and 
the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, and Croatia have all been granted 
Candidate status.33 A European Union Candidate has been accepted in principle and can accede 
to the Union once the country incorporates into its national law the Community’s immense set of 
laws, the acquis communitaire. The FYROM and Croatia are expected to accede to the Union by 
2013, while Turkey’s accession is contested. Turkey’s Candidate status was granted largely as a 
concession over the status of Greek Cyprus. Potential candidates— those who could feasibly 
apply for membership— include the Western Balkan states Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo 
(internationally recognized by most EU member states, but not by the Union), and the members 
of the Eastern Partnership. The Eastern Partnership is a project inaugurated in 2009 to improve 
political and economic relations of the EU with six post-Soviet states: the Ukraine, Belarus, 
                                                 
32 Emerson, Michael, Senem Aydin, Julia De Clerck-Sachsse and Gergana Noutcheva. “Just What is this ‘absorption 
capacity’ of the European Union?” CEPS Policy brief, No. 113, September 2006 
33 So named because of Greek legal protests over the name “Macedonia” 
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Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. However, the strength of the Eastern Partnership’s 
potential membership is questionable and likely turns on the status of Turkey.  
The last decade’s expansion caused member states to express an unwillingness to move 
on open applications.34 Eurobarometer polls of European citizens also expressed this view.35 This 
unwillingness is dubbed by commentators as “enlargement fatigue.”36 
Additionally, the Eurobarometer shows that “euroskepticism” rose in the past decade. 
This is a general term to describe criticism of the EU that fundamentally opposes the process of 
European integration. The rhetoric of political parties on the socialist left and nationalist right 
particularly focus on this criticism.37 These parties have been gaining seats within the European 
Union’s elected organs. Moreover, scholarship and the media frequently study the ‘democratic 
deficit’ of the European Union.38  
The rise in enlargement fatigue and prevalent euroskepticism are frequently cited as 
causes for the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 in two of the founding member states, 
France and the Netherlands.39 This rejection solidified the general trend over the past decade for 
the EU: a short, rapid expansion and integration of EU membership followed by generally 
negative feelings towards a deeper and wider Union. There may be a causal relationship between 
                                                 
34 See for example, Piket, Vincent. “EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy” Russian Regional Perspectives 
Journal Vol 1 Issue 3. Accessed last 17 April 2010 at http://www.iiss.org/programmes/russia-and-eurasia/copyof-
russian-regional-perspectives-journal/rrp-volume-1-issue-3/eu-enlargement-and-and-neighbourhood-policy/ 
35 Wyles, John. “The EU suffers from more than enlargement fatigue” EuropeanVoice.com 14 May 2005. Accessed 
last 29 March 2010 at: http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/the-eu-suffers-from-more-than-enlargement-
fatigue/64874.aspx 
36 Christiansen and Reh 
37 Who use the term to describe an opposition to a regionalized capitalistic system. See Sørensen, Catharina. 
“Danish and British popular Euroskepticism compared: A Skeptical Assessment of the concept.” (Copenhagen: 
Danish Institute for International Studies, 2004) 
38 Szczerbiak, Aleks and Paul Taggart. Opposing Europe?: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. 
Volumes I and II. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
39 Christiansen, Thomas and Christine Reh, Constitutionalizing the European Union (New York, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 
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the community’s expansion and expressed negativity to the community, 40  but one should be 
wary of such a simplistic causal chain when examining social actors.  
For human rights protection, this trend presented a stumbling block for the integration of 
the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms into community treaty law. The Charter’s incorporation 
into treaty law was a necessary condition for its full enforceability under the ECJ, and the failure 
of the Constitutional Treaty reflected poorly on the future of the Charter. Thus, the Charter’s re-
inclusion in the Lisbon Treaty reflects the historical durability of the consensus European actors 
constructed during the Charter’s creation. This consensus is discussed in detail in Chapter III. 
 
ii. The Operational Structures of the European Union 
 
The European Union is structurally divided into the European Council, the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the European Court of 
Justice. Over the course of the treaties, these organs maintained their general purposes although 
their operational procedures and interactions changed.41  The primary purposes of these organs 
are to produce and enforce the Union’s secondary legislation. Secondary legislation is law 
created by the Union’s organs but derived from treaty competences. This is compared to primary 
legislation, which is the treaty law itself. Under treaty law, a state must incorporate into its 
national law all secondary legislation that applies to the state. 
                                                 
40 Stone Sweet, Alec. The Judicial Construction of Europe (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004) 
pp. 4-11. 
41The following sections are derived fairly closely from  Nugent, Neil. The Government and Politics of the 
European Union 6th ed. The European Union Series (New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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The European Council is the organ comprising the heads of state or government of every 
member state. It meets infrequently42 and deals with general principles of the European Union. It 
has no formal legislative power, and expresses the member states’ goals for the Union.  
The European Commission is the bureaucracy of the European Union. The Commission 
begins the legislative process and is the only organ with the authority to originate legislation. The 
Commission also conducts the Unions' studies, ensures Member State compliance with 
legislation, and undertakes the payroll, scheduling, and other administrative functions of the 
Union.  
The Council of Ministers (not to be confused with the European Council), now formally 
named the “Consilium,”43 represent member states’ interests in the EU legislature. Every 
member state has one representative (now at 27) in the Council of Ministers. Formerly the 
Ministers each had a veto on a wide band of legislation. The Lisbon treaty eventually will revoke 
this veto in 2014 when it applies more qualified majority voting to the Council of Ministers’ 
voting structure.  
Qualified majority voting weights states by population and requires either 50 or 67% of 
member states who represent at least 62% of the EU’s population for a motion to pass. In 2014, 
the Lisbon Treaty will change the Council of Ministers’ veto system by requiring 4 countries or 
35% of the represented population vote to block a motion. The Council of Ministers can also 
unanimously decide to change a voting structure for certain forms of legislation from unanimity 
to either qualified majority voting or even simple majority voting. This Council of Ministers 
action is labeled the ‘passerelle’ procedure.44  
                                                 
42 At minimum, twice every 6 months 
43 A latin word adopted to avoid this confusion 
44 McCormick, John. Understanding the European Union. The European Union Series(New York, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) p 74 
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The European Council appoints the Council of Ministers’ president and cabinet. Since the 
Council of Ministers does not have the authority to initiate legislation, it receives bills from the 
Commission. The Council of Ministers is therefore gradually changing from an organ that 
represents member states’ interests to a more constrained forum that expresses member state 
opinion. Currently the Council of Ministers still has a great deal of power in stopping the 
Parliament’s legislation, but this power is gradually contracting. 
The European Parliament was designed in 1952 as the European residents’ representative 
organ.45 Originally its membership (“MEPs”) was drawn from member state parliaments. After 
the treaties of Rome, MEPs are directly elected in European elections. Due to member state 
dissent in the Council of Ministers, European elections didn’t actually occur until the passage of 
the Merger Treaty. The Parliament now passes legislation on the basis of a simple majority and 
rejects legislation on the basis of an absolute majority. A simple majority requires only more 
than 50% of the representatives present at quorum, while absolute majority requires 50% of all 
elected representatives.46   
The European Court of Justice is located in Luxembourg and comprises the Court of 
Justice (from 1952), the Court of First Instance (from 1988), and the Civil Service Tribunal 
(from 2004). One appointed judge from each member state sits on each court. Each court has a 
registry in addition to its general chambers, which oversees the administration of the court in 
areas of finance, translation, document preparation, etc.  
The Court of Justice can sit either in chambers of three or five judges or in a Grand 
Chamber of 13 judges. The Court operates collegiately; decisions are delivered from the Court as 
                                                 
45 Originally the Parliament was called the “Common Assembly” 
46 In an absolute majority vote absence or abstention equates to a no-vote. 
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a whole and minority opinions are not procedurally allowed.47 The ECJ can make directly 
actionable decisions, or interpretive decisions under a preliminary ruling. The Court can also 
propose interim measures within these decisions. A direct action is immediately binding on the 
parties involved and sets a timeline and other requirements for compliance. States, institutions, or 
individuals can request preliminary rulings of the Court regarding the interpretation of a 
community law. Decisions on preliminary rulings are binding insofar as their interpretation is 
followed. The Court’s jurisdiction is confined to those areas explicitly made judicable in the 
primary law of the Community (i.e. the Treaties).  
 
Before the Lisbon treaty, most secondary law under the Maastricht treaty’s second pillar 
(Common Foreign and Security Policy) and all secondary law under the Maastricht treaty’s third 
pillar (Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters) was outside the Court’s jurisdiction. 
The Lisbon Treaty consolidates the pillar structure, and all forms of community law are now 
within the ECJ’s jurisdiction. 
The three-pillar structure dividing EU activities by subject area was first adopted in the 
Maastricht Treaty. The different pillars delineated the legislative processes and voting structures 
of the Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The different pillars could also negate the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction. 
The first pillar covered economic, social and environmental policies. In these areas the 
EU had a great deal of supranational competence and had an international legal personality to 
negotiate with third parties. The second pillar was the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
which dealt with border control, immigration, and foreign policy. The Council of Ministers had 
                                                 




greater power than the Parliament or the Commission in this area, and thus member states 
ostensibly had a veto in this area.  The second pillar severely limited the ECJ’s jurisdiction. The 
third pillar, Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, dealt with Europol, sharing of 
intelligence, and the cooperation of national judiciaries. Member States had an actual veto over 
EU policies in this area and the ECJ had no jurisdiction.  
Under the Lisbon Treaty, these three pillars are consolidated. The pillars’ structure can 
still be felt as subject areas continue to vary the legislative processes of the Parliament and 
Council of Ministers. The gradation of EU legislative competence will exist at least until 2014, 
but it will likely last for the foreseeable future. However, after Lisbon all EU law is judicable 
under the ECJ. Obviously, there is little case law in those areas formerly under the second and 
third pillars. 
 
 The Lisbon Treaty changed the details of the EU’s legislative processes. The Lisbon 
Treaty rather changes the power dynamics of the Union’s organs, but the process remains 
functionally equivalent. The commission originates and drafts all legislation. Based on the 
legislation’s policy area, it is passed by the Parliament and the Council of Ministers using one of 
three procedures: the co-decision, assent, or consultation procedure.48  
The co-decision procedure has complex rules for the Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers to conduct various readings and amendment procedures,49 and results in a final 
reconciliation process before adoption. The assent procedure requires only the assent of an 
                                                 
48 Consilium “Decision-making in the European Union” at http://europa.eu/institutions/decision-
making/index_en.htm. Accessed last: 31 March 2010.  
49 For a flow chart see the Commission’s webpage, http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/stepbystep/diagram_en.htm 
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absolute majority the Parliament before the Council of Ministers can adopt an act.50 Finally, the 
consultation procedure allows the Parliament to approve, reject, or request amendments to the 
Commission. Under consultation, the Council of Ministers can amend the measure only by 
unanimous vote but can adopt or reject the measure using the odd voting rules covered above.51  
The co-decision procedure gives the Parliament primary control; the assent procedure 
gives the Council of Ministers primary control; and the consultation procedure gives the 
Commission primary control.  
The forms of secondary legislation that move through the EU’s organs are regulations, 
directives, decisions, and recommendations/opinions. Regulations are binding for all member 
states. They deal with policy areas in the EU’s sole competence, and must be transposed into 
national law.52 Directives require certain member states to achieve a general goal without 
dictating the means to achieve it.53 Directives and their timetables are binding on the member 
states addressed, but transposition into national law is indefinite due to the inherent ambiguity of 
a directive.54 Decisions are binding to those states or individuals to whom it is addressed, and are 
typically used for proposed mergers.55 Recommendations and opinions are non-binding.56 
 
The legislative procedure and voting rules of the EU organs for producing regulations, 
directives, decisions and opinions are graded with the policy area’s supranationalization in the 
                                                 
50 An absolute majority requires more than 50% of total representatives to pass. Compare this to a simple majority 
which only requires more than 50% of the representatives present to pass. Thus, under absolute majority, an absence 
or abstention is effectively a ‘no’ vote. 
51 See Chapter I pp. 22-23 
52 Article 288, TEU (formerly 249 of the TEC) 
53 Ibid. 
54 McCormick, John. Understanding the European Union. The European Union Series (New York, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) p. 238 
55 Craig, Paul and Gráinne de Búrca EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials (4th ed. ed.). (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 2007) p. 279 
56 Article 288, TEU (formerly 249, TEC) 
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treaties. Before Lisbon, this valuation was organized under the three pillars. Now, legislative 
rules shall be decided on a case by case basis by the Council of Ministers, but all policy areas can 
be judicable in the ECJ’s jurisdiction.  
 
Additionally, Lisbon has provided the EU an international legal personality in all 
respects. Member states have therefore given the EU an ability to accede to treaties, make 
agreements with third parties, apply to certain international courts, and join certain international 
organizations. In terms of human rights, this implies that the EU as a whole can accede to the 
Council of Europe and the ECHR. This accession, should it actually occur, would subject 
community law and action to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction. 
The European Union is fundamentally a supranational government with limited 
competences. These competences have expanded at the behest of Member States, who sign 
treaties and incorporate them into national law. For the European human rights regime, this 
means that the expansion of the ECJ’s jurisdiction into all forms and functions of the EU’s 
secondary laws relates fundamentally to member state behavior. How this member state behavior 
is constructed is analyzed in Chapter III.  
 
iii. Limitless growth 
 
Over the past century, the European Union has expanded its membership and deepened 
the integration of member states into the regional structures. This growth appears to have been 
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exponential after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The rate of these developments has caused some 
commentators57 to argue that the EU may indicate a post-national era in Europe.  
However, these commentators may be jumping the gun by declaring the EU as inevitably 
on a path towards fully regional government. The traction of euroskepticism and the failure of 
the Constitutional treaty in the past decade imply that member state citizens do not perceive a 
common European identity as an accurate description of their social identities. Further, 
euroskeptcism may rise in the coming year in Germany, France, and the other founding members 
in reaction to the economic problems that face Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and much of the 
Eastern bloc.  
The idea that the European Union has a manifest destiny, or some definite end, should be 
viewed with skepticism even though post Cold War history can be read to support such a 
conclusion.  
This paper obliquely addresses this skepticism of European growth by studying the 
convergence of the Union with the European Convention of Human Rights. Focusing on the 
jurisdictional boundaries of the ECJ and the ECtHR, it examines a narrow area of the Union’s 
growth.  
This narrowness allows the paper to ask certain questions, while necessarily limiting it 
elsewhere. To justify a jurisdictional approach, the next section argues that international courts 
are proper forums to conduct a regional study. The following section then shows that a 
constructivist study is a useful approach to study international courts.  
 
                                                 
57 See for example, Schäffner, Christina, Andreas Musolff, and Michael Townson. “Diversity and Unity in European 
Debates” in Conceiving of Europe: Diversity in Unity (Brookfield, Vermont: Dartmouth University Press, 1996); 
Stone Sweet, Alec. The Judicial Construction of Europe (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004); 
and Chryssochoou, Dimitris N. Theorizing European Integration. (New York, New York: Routledge, 2009) 
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ii. Why study international courts? 
International human rights courts matter for regional studies because they represent one 
form of regional integration. For Europe, the abuses of individual rights by states during the first 
half of the 20th century and the inability of weak global political leagues to prevent them affected 
the focus of state foreign policies. In the second half of the 20th century these policies centered 
on creating stronger global and regional political, legal, and economic organizations. 
Domestically, European states pushed to incorporate stronger human rights codes within national 
law.  
Europe’s participation in the creation of the UN and the Security Council symbolized 
Europe’s global effort. The Council of Europe symbolized Europe’s regional efforts. The 
European Coal and Steel Community represented the regional organization of economies. Bi- 
and multi-lateral treaties on the prevention of human rights abuses and the reconstitution of 
nations such as Germany around a strong human rights code represented the internal efforts of 
European states to prevent human rights abuses.  
These efforts were all fundamentally based on legal measures. Their treaties were 
legislative and often imposed on states written obligations to act in certain ways. These treaty 
laws were enforceable by international courts, socio-political processes, or a combination of 
both. These enforcement methods’ continuing efficacies depend on whether the process is used, 
and how actors react to the process.  
Actors use international courts because actors can promote their interest structures 
without the use of force in international courts’ neutral forums. Studies of individual judge 
behavior and individual and institutional behavior in international courts’ jurisdictions prove that 
international courts can indeed be geopolitically neutral. 
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Since courts necessarily assume that individual judges can act impartially, partiality 
might emerge from a comparison of a judge’s actions in cases involving their home state to the 
judge’s actions in cases involving other states. Erik Voeten studies the international judges of the 
ECtHR, to explore this possibility.58 Voeten coded 7,319 judgments published between 1960 and 
2006 by issue, characteristics of the judge(s), the resulting judgment, and the judges’ 
relationships to the accused government, and then ran correlation analyses to find relationships. 
Voeten doesn’t find evidence to suggest judges to act in a systematically geopolitical fashion. 
Rather, he offers evidence that judges can ostensibly be impartial in international courts. Thus, 
legitimate international courts can be neutral forums for international actors’ interactions. 
International courts therefore can legitimately be engaged, but are they? 
Every year, individuals apply more frequently to both the ECtHR59 and the ECJ than the 
last.60 The ECtHR, between 1955 and 1998 had around 45,000 applications total. In 2007 alone, 
the ECtHR had almost 49,900 new applications.61 The ECJ had 445 new applications in 1997,62 
compared to 1,807 applications in 2008.63  
Individuals consistently engage their governments in the court, but do governments react 
to individual complaints in the court? Indeed, they do. 
                                                 
58 Voeten, Eric. “The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights” in 
American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 4 (November 2008) 
59 Registry of the European Court of Human Rights. European Court of Human Rights Survey of Activities 1959-
1998, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 (Strasbourg: 2000-2008) accessed last 11 
April 2010 at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Reports+and+Statistics/Reports/Annual+surveys+of+activity/ 
60 Registry of the European Court of Justice. Annual Report of the Court of Justice (1997-2008). (Luxembourg: 
1998-2009) accessed last 11 April 2010 at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7015/ 
61 See note 4, 2007. P. 3 
62 Registry of the European Court of Justice. Statistical information of the Court of Justice (1997). (Luxembourg: 
1998) p. 3 
63 Ibid. 2008, p. 81, 100-101 
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Member states have, at the same time, increasingly appealed the ECJ’s decisions and 
increasingly referred individual’s cases to its jurisdiction.64 When the ECtHR communicates an 
application to a respondent government, the government almost always engages the cases— 
3,552 of the 4,416 applications relayed to governments last year were argued within some 
chamber of the court.65 Double counting is likely in these statistics, as the ECtHR’s registry 
compiles statistics individually for each chamber, who can hear the same cases. These statistics 
do generally show that states engaged the court in around 1,000 cases per year and often 
followed cases to their conclusions. However, as over 8,000 cases are still at pre-judicial stages 
(i.e. fact-finding or have been settled outside of the Court), states may engage more cases than 
are counted.  
However one looks at it, states engage individual challenges within the ECJ and the 
ECtHR, and provide counter claims to appeal negative decisions where they can. 
 
Furthermore, states engage each other in the European courts. The ECJ is more 
frequently used by states than the ECtHR. Between 1961 and 2008, states applied to the ECJ for 
6,318 preliminary rulings, 8,340 direct actions, and 994 appeals in cases regarding other states. 
Application rates per year to the ECJ have increased in frequency. In 2008, Georgia brought an 
application against Russia in the ECtHR over the conflict in South Ossetia; this was the first 
interstate application since the Cyprus conflict garnered four from Turkey against Greece in the 
early 1990’s. There have been a total of 13 interstate applications in the ECtHR.66 This tells us 
                                                 
64 See note 5, 2008, p 101, 102-103, 104-106 
65 Registry of the European Court of Human Rights. Annual Report 2008 (Strasbourg: 2009)P 135 accessed last 11 
April 2010 at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5B2847D-640D-4A09-A70A-
7A1BE66563BB/0/ANNUAL_REPORT_2008.pdf 
66 Lemmens, P and Wouter Vandenhole Protocol no 14 and the reform of the European Court of Human Rights. 
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005) p. 72 
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that states are more likely to interact within the ECJ than in the ECtHR. It also shows that states 
only apply to the ECtHR in times of forceful conflict between two states. 
The take-away is that states and individuals both use and react constructively to the 
courts. States do not unilaterally undermine the ECJ or the ECtHR’s authority like the US has 
undermined the ICC. Therefore, international courts are a valid case study because they can 
affect actor interaction and apparently hold enough legitimacy in the eyes of actors to be actually 
utilized. However, demonstrating that international courts can be studied does not define how to 
study them. The following section does this by justifying the usage of Constructivist tools in this 
study. 
 
iii.  Why use constructivism? 
 
Methodology choices necessarily open some doors while closing others. This section 
justifies this paper’s usage of constructivism. It first describes the theory generally, as put forth 
by Alexander Wendt and Ian Hurd. It then relates constructivism to international courts. 
Constructivism is the study of how actors understand the world around them. It 
approaches actors’ internal identity- and interest-formation processes as inter-subjective and 
avoids exogenously given interest structures.67 It employs sociological tools to examine how 
actors express these identities and interests.  
Actors form their identities and interests by relating internal experience to external 
reality. In the process of this interaction, actors perceive and organize experience into a 
referential catalog of symbols and concepts, which are labeled using communicative language. 
When an actor communicates with another actor, they both add new experience to their available 
                                                 
67 Externally constructed, imported 
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organization and can alter their set of internal definitions. Thus, a symbol’s meaning is internally 
constructed by an actor as it relates to and interacts with external actions or actors.  
This inter-subjective identity-formation potentially brings up problems of perception, 
language, and expression. Actor interaction is a complex socializing process as actors can 
perceive differently, use language differently, and express meaning differently. As they interact, 
actors learn and adjust meaning. This creates a series of feedback loops where an actor is 
processing information about the external world’s perception, language and expression as it 
receives more information. To understand how actors engage a constantly shifting reality and 
construct meaning, identities, and interests out of it, one needs to track objects that reflect these 
shifting internal conceptualizations of external reality. 
Ian Hurd examines an actor’s identity formation processes by tracking the context and 
logical premises of an actor’s coercive symbol usage. Assuming that actors rationally pursue 
their interests, Hurd relates what the actor conceives a symbol to mean to how the actor used the 
concept to coerce others during their interactions. Since the symbols’ coercive usage was 
ostensibly caused by a rational pursuit of endogenously identified positive outcomes,68 Hurd can 
deduce the actors’ logical premises. Having identified an actor’s conceptualization of the symbol 
and the context it perceived, Hurd can potentially reconstruct a small aspect of the actor’s 
internal identity- and interest-formation at a given moment. This identification then can lead to 
predicting behavior in more nuanced ways than formerly possible. However, it is also limited in 
what it can predict. 
Constructivism relates actors within a relatively short time span. This allows for and 
requires a simultaneous analysis of multiple actors within a limited time-frame. The theory is 
therefore limited in its ability to extrapolate into a new context without additional information — 
                                                 
68Values that are internally constructed, and ranked in preference. 
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as by then the symbols, actors, and situation have changed. However, since it describes general 
processes, outcomes from a constructivist study can inform the study of a new situation by 
providing actors’ general interest- and identity-formation processes. Like an algorithm, if the 
identification of these processes is accurate, it can provide accurate predictions relatively 
quickly. Or, for an outside observer to understand an area’s internal processes. 
For example, assume that a study of actor interaction at the 2009 United Nations Climate 
Change Summit (“COP 15”) identifies that German leaders understood environmental problems 
at that time and place in terms of a populism aimed at future generations. By adding in 
information about the German reaction to the process and outcome of COP 15, one can predict 
the general argument that a German leader will make in UN environmental discussions. While 
this may seem to be an obvious conclusion that any perceptive individual could glean from 
experience, the power of constructivism lies in its ability to be applied to areas outside of an 
analyst’s immediate experience.  
In relation to international courts, constructivism can help observers understand how 
various actors construct identities in relation to the regional human rights regime. Courts are rife 
with socially constructed symbols. The rule of law— the foundation for any court— is a 
constructed symbol often wielded by actors to coerce others. Individuals constrain their behavior 
according to both procedural and social decorum rules while in court. The media uses the cities 
of the courts’ seats as synecdoche for the institutions and the human rights regime as a whole. 




International courts have symbols which are used by actors who endogenously construct 
identities and interests. Therefore, constructivism can bear analytical fruit, provided that the aims 
and predictions are narrowly constructed. 
Diagram 5 (next page) outlines the conceptual structure of the European human rights 
regime and labels the interactions that this paper studies using a constructivist method.  
 
Diagram 5. The simplified network of the European human rights regime 
This paper focuses primarily on analyzing the interactions between EU member states 
and each court. The process of studying these interactions requires and allows a description of 
how individuals interact with states through the courts. This method also allows an examination 
of how the courts interact with each other. Since the context of the actors is essential to 
understanding the actors’ interest-formation processes, frequent note will be made to external 
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European Union members of the Council of Europe is one such example of a fundamental 
secondary actor relevant to the European human rights regime.  
This paper studies the left side of the diagram, and then the right. It examines the 
ECtHR’s network of relationships first, and then looks at the ECJ’s network of relationships. 
Individuals and member states are constants in the analysis, while the other court is viewed as a 
constant standing in the margins.  
This chapter has outlined the institutions of the Council of Europe and the European 
Union and justified the usage of international courts and constructivism for understanding 
regional political structures. Chapter II examines the creation and functioning of the ECtHR 
during the deliberations of the Council of Europe and through its jurisprudence. Chapter III 
examines the functioning and reconstitution of the ECJ through its jurisprudence and around the 
intergovernmental convention that created the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Chapter IV 
concludes this paper by relating the ECJ’s and the ECtHR’s internally and externally constructed 















 The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) is the judicial arm of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”). The Court oversees and 
adjudicates the protection of individual human rights within the member-states of the Council of 
Europe. The Court is primarily an intergovernmental organization but exhibits some 
supranational characteristics.  
The Court’s authority comes from an intergovernmental convention that relies on 
member state adherence. Its enforcement apparatus is only the social threat69 of expulsion or 
suspension from the Council of Europe.70 However, the court’s internal processes are reminiscent 
                                                 
69 Though, one can possibly argue that the expulsion or suspension by the Council of Europe leads to MS policy 
support of the Court’s decision and thus individual Member states act as part of its enforcement apparatus. I think 
this argument is a different side of the same coin.  
70 Greece withdrew before being expelled in the late sixties during their domestic civil war. Turkey was suspended 
in the early eighties for a military coup, and Russia was suspended at the turn of the millennium for their Chechnya 
policies. Valls, Raquel. “Withdrawal, expulsion and suspension of a member state of the Council of Europe” 
(Sanem, Luxembourg: Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe) viewed in European Navigator, www.ena.lu, 
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of a supranational court; the Court acts independently of its member states,71 and its internal 
leadership is elected internally.72  
The Court began operating in the early sixties and still runs today, though in altered form. 
Post-World-War II theories of international cooperation defined the ECHR’s creation; its 
protected rights come from the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of 1949.  
This chapter examines the European Court on Human Right and its jurisdiction in the 
European human rights regime in relation to individuals and states. By beginning with the 
history of the Court’s post-war founding, this chapter first establishes what the court is. Second, 
the chapter relates what the Court does by analyzing its case law when the court interacts with 
member states over jurisdictional challenges. This chapter then establishes how the court acts 
within European politics and relates what the Court is to what it does. The chapter concludes that 
the ECtHR is an intergovernmental court that gradually expands its authority but is 
fundamentally constrained by intergovernmental language. 
 
i. What it is: the Court’s constitutive telos 
 
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) oversaw the protection of individual 
human rights within the member states of the Council of Europe in conjunction with a European 
Commission on Human Rights until Protocol 11 passed in 1998. The European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) and the European Court of Human Rights 
                                                 
71 ECHR § II Arts 32-51, particularly Articles 44 and 46. See also Voeten, Eric. “The Impartiality of International 
Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights” in American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 4 
(November 2008) for an examination of whether international judges can legitimately be impartial through an 
inherent-biases analysis of ECtHR dissents. 
72 ECHR §II Art. 22 
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(“ECtHR”) came into existence in 1950 after the creation of the Council of Europe (“CoE”) at 
the Hague Congress.73  
Member states at the 1948 Congress of Europe in The Hague perceived that a convention 
on human rights constituted a fundamental part of the Congress’ telos. The resolution that came 
out of the 1948 Hague Congress stated, “…the resultant Union or Federation [of this conference] 
should be open to all European nations democratically governed and which undertake to respect 
a  Charter of Human Rights… [and] a Commission should be set up to undertake immediately 
the double task of drafting such a Charter and of laying down standards….”74  
The Hague Congress was attended by over a thousand individuals: 750 official delegates 
from European national governments, ex officio parliamentary members from minority parties, 
and observers from Canada and the United States.75 The leaders, and main speakers, of the 
Congress were: Winston Churchill, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Sir David Maxwell-Fife, Harold 
Macmillan, Konrad Adenauer, Paul van Zeeland, Albert Coppé, and Altiero Spinelli.76 The 
Hague Congress, therefore, represented the majority will of Western Europe to establish a 
regional structure to protect human rights. However, this was complicated by the dual role these 
actors played in the UN where simultaneously discussion over the UDHR was occurring. 
To understand how the regional debate affected the creation and the constitution of the 
ECtHR, one must begin at the beginning. The first subsection examines the preparatory work for 
the convention’s deliberations including the actors who motivated the convention, the source 
material they used in the convention process, and the symbols they used. The second subsection 
                                                 
73 Congress of Europe, May 1948 Council of Europe 1999 
74 Council of Europe “Political Resolution of the Hague Congress (7-10 May 1948)” Congress of Europe: The 
Hague- May, 1948. (London-Paris: International Committee of the Movements for European Unity, 1948) pp. 5-7. 
Viewed at http://www.ena.lu/political_resolution_hague_congress_710_1948-2-12226 on 13 January 2010 




examines the proceedings themselves. It explores how member states interacted with one another 
using symbols within the debate structure.  
The third subsection draws conclusions from the first two to argue that the ECtHR is an 
intergovernmental court intended to protect the lowest common denominator of rights across the 
Council of Europe’s member states. It also argues that this constitution was fundamentally 
motivated by the conflict between the UN’s global identity and the European regional identity 
over the proper enforcement mechanism for the protection of individual rights. 
 
A. Preparatory Work 
 
The preparatory work of the Council of Europe began long before participants started to 
organize the deliberations, as delegates were socialized prior to the Council meetings. To 
understand their relationships prior to the deliberations, one ought to outline their general 
interests. This subsection first outlines the actors who participated in the Council of Europe’s 
deliberations and their social relationships. It then describes the source material that the 
convention used and with which most participants were mostly familiar. It finally surveys the 
symbols that they used to interact, communicate, and coerce one another.  
 
i. The Actors 
 
The actors involved in the deliberations were all somehow connected to the European 
Movement. 77  The European Movement was the post-war, pan-European party for general 
                                                 
77 Zurchee, Arnold J. The Struggle to Unite Europe: 1940-1958. (New York, New York: New York University 
Press, 1958), pp. 30-33; 40-43 
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European unity.78 The movement wrote the first draft Convention and therefore set the initial 
rhetorical structure for the debate to follow.79  While this does not imply that the language of the 
European Movements’ draft was immutable, it does show that the European Movement 
preconditioned member state delegates to its rhetoric before the debate. The Movement 
collectively lined the playing field in which delegates would debate. 
The Movement’s stated purpose in the late 1940’s was to structurally unite Europe and 
rebuild its economy. It consisted of over 1,000 members80 from Western European legislatures 
and executives. These members formed a loose association which espoused general principles 
and met infrequently.81 Its leadership came from a British and French coalition: Sir Winston 
Churchill, David Maxwell-Fyfe, Jean Monnet, Georges Bidault, Henri Teitgen, Paul Ramadier, 
Robert Schuman and Leon Blum.82   
The Movement, as an organization of national leadership, was a loosely collected 
political party that espoused regional integration and that constructed national leaders’ social 
norms. Its rhetoric valued structural solutions to achieve regional peace based on democratic, 
intergovernmental unification. Further, its rhetoric focused on unification without the influence 
of either a foreign Empire (the USSR or the US) or of a single political party (Communists, 
Socialists).  
Most individual member state delegations to the Convention deliberations had also 
participated in the deliberations in the United Nations General Assembly over the Universal 
                                                 
78 Zurchee, Arnold J. The Struggle to Unite Europe: 1940-1958. (New York, New York: New York University 
Press, 1958) 
79It exists today as a ‘non-governmental pressure-group’ (i.e. a lobbyist organization). See The European Movement. 
“The Objectives of the European Movement” at: http://www.europeanmovement.eu/index.php?id=6781 Accessed 
last 13 January 2010. 
80 Mowbray, Alastair. Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights. Second Edition (Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
81 Ibid. 
82 Zurchee. at 20-23 
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Declaration of Human Rights the year before. Many high-level delegates operated in both arenas, 
but their full staffs are unlikely to have travelled with them. The Italian and Irish delegates to the 
Council of Europe, however, had not been present at the UN’s discussions since the Irish and 
Italian governments had not joined the UN.83  
Pierre Henri-Teitgen and Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe were the main drafters of the 
Convention.84 They were the lead French and British delegates to the process as well. They were 
also both trained as lawyers. Pierre Teitgen was a politician and professor from Brittany 
associated with DeGaulle. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe was a conservative politician, prosecutor, 
and judge from Scotland. Teitgen went on to help in the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community, and Maxwell-Fyfe became a prosecutor at the Nuremburg trials. Thus, the leaders 
of the Council of Europe that created the ECHR were prominent British and French lawyers. 
 
ii.  Source material 
  
The 1948 UDHR was the primary source for the European Movement’s draft 
convention.85 The draft included 16 of the UDHR’s 30 Articles. Twenty-three were eventually 
restated in the Final Convention’s86 seventeen substantive (i.e. non bureaucracy building) 
portions in substantially the same language.87  
                                                 
83 Collected Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoires” Vol. I./VII (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus, Nijhoff; 1975) 
(“Collected Edition”)  pp 2-18 
84 Collected Edition Vol. I. pp 92-96. They also conducted questionnaires during the treaty-making process to 
determine general opinion of the state representatives on certain aspects of the treaty varying from the list of rights 
to be protected to whether a certain word should be included.  
85 Draft Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Collected Edition of the 
“Travaux Préparatoires” Vol. 1 (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus, Nijhoff; 1975) Appendix 1 pp. 285-295. 
86 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In Mowbray, Alastair. Appendix 1, 
pp 1013-1023; Protocol 1 pp. 1023-1024; Protocol 4 pp. 1025-1026; Protocol 6 pp. 1026-1027; Protocol 7 pp. 1028-
1030; Protocol 12 pp. 1030-1031; Protocol 13 pp. 1032-1033; Protocol 14 pp. 1033-1038.  
87 For a table that details this analysis see Appendix A. 
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  The main features of the UDHR are a list of positive rights for individuals and negative 
obligations for the state. 88 This list can be generally classified under eight headings: basic 
individual rights,89 family rights,90 socio-economic rights,91 political rights,92 judicial rights,93 
cultural rights,94 educational rights,95 and social structural rights.96 UDHR Article 29’s social 
structural rights include limitations for the sake of social welfare and general principles of law.97  
The UDHR included an avenue to defer to states within its substance. But the UDHR’s 
main deference to state sovereignty is its form. The Declaration is a non-binding statement, not a 
treaty. The UDHR has only recently been recognized as part of customary international law. As a 
source it holds with strong moral legitimacy98 but no direct enforceability.99  
 The European Movement drew up a Draft Convention that was much more limited in 
scope than the UDHR, although drawing from its provisions. Of the UDHR’s eight general 
headings the draft convention included only four: individual rights, family rights, judicial rights, 
and social structural rights.100 Most of the UDHR’s verbiage was left out; the draft included its 
                                                 
88 See Appendix for justification of these titles. 
89 Articles: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 18, 19, 20 
90 Articles: 12, 16  
91 Articles: 17, 22, 23, 24, 25 
92 Articles: 13, 14,  
93 Articles: 7, 10, 11, 15, 21, 28 
94 Article: 27 
95 Article: 26 
96 Article: 8, 29, 30 
97 Article 29(2) “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order 
and the general welfare in a democratic society.” 
98 Though challenges are made to its universal legitimacy by Islamic states practicing Shar’iah law, who claim the 
Declaration is a “secular expression of the Judeo-Christian tradition”. See Littman, David. "Universal Human Rights 
and Human Rights in Islam". Midstream, February/March 1999 at http://web.archive.org/web/20060501234759. 
Accessed 6 February 2010. 
99 Dunoff, Jeffery L., Steven R. Ratner, and David Wippman. International Law: Norms Actors, Process: A 
Problem-oriented Approach. (New York, NY: Aspen Publishers, 2006) p. 78-87 
100 See Appendix A 
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rights in a single article with 11 brief sub-articles. However, the text cross-references its source 
in the UDHR.101  
According to observers, the reliance on the UDHR was meant “to co-ordinate the activity 
of the Council of Europe with that of the United Nations, as by reason of the moral authority and 
technical value of the [UDHR].”102 The intention to create an enforceable document from the 
provisions of the nonbinding declaration was therefore inherent in the draft convention’s 
structure. 
 At the time that the Council of Europe was wrestling with regional human rights 
protection, the UN103  was itself figuring out the full extent of its human rights regime. The 
debate in the UN Commission on Human Rights104 had stalled over the last two years. On 26 
April 1950 the Commission finally passed a resolution which terminated debate over how to 
enforce the Universal Declaration.105  
This parallel debate on the global level directly influenced the regional debate in Europe. 
The ambiguity of the global debate complicated how states approached the Council of Europe 
and a convention that relies on the UDHR. 
 
iii.  The symbols 
 
 During the deliberations, actors addressed one another using symbols of organizational 
relationships, normative values, and legitimacy. They primarily discussed three fundamental 
                                                 
101 See Collected Edition Vol I.  p. 194 
102 Ibid., also more generally at p. 44-46, 94-6, and 156-8 
103 Housed then in Lake Success, New York Collected Edition Vol. IV pp. 84-100 
104Established in 1946; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. At 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/index.htm. accessed 16 February 2010 
105 Anonymous.  “World Criminal Court Idea Bobs Up Again” The Chicago Daily Tribune. 16 April 1950; 




questions facing the deliberative bodies. First, what is the relationship between the Council of 
Europe and the UN, or, what should be the relationship of the ECHR to the UDHR? Second, 
what rights are fundamental and how are they defined? Third, what mechanism best protects 
fundamental individual rights? 
 
When actors addressed the question of the Council’s relationship to the UN, they used 
arguments that identified the Council either as subordinate to or equal with the UN as a whole. 
Thus, actors stressed either a monist or a dualist system of political organization between the 
regional and global organizations.  
 
When actors addressed the question of substantial rights,106 they utilized two symbolic 
axes— the substance and extent of rights. 
 To communicate about the substance of rights, actors used concepts of a wide or narrow 
spectrum of rights. In doing so, they argued for the Council to take a certain position on the axis 
or identified a set of rights neglected in the axis.  
To communicate about the extent of rights that can be protected, actors used an axis 
based on the level of enumeration in a right. Actors argued for the Council to either define 
provisions specifically or broadly. They typically did so to either narrow or broaden the 
interpretative horizons of the provision.   
Thus, actors dealt with the substance of human rights by employing a dual axes 
organization based on the number of rights to include, and how to include them. 
 
                                                 




Diagram 7. The Axes of ECHR Human Rights Provisions 
  Substance 
  Vague Specific 
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 When actors addressed the enforcement question, they used either the idea of a court, a 
commission, or their relationship to communicate. For example, when Britain argued that a court 
might not be a feasible mechanism to garner wide member state support, its delegates 
communicated their belief that a court with primary jurisdiction over its member states is not 
normatively valuable. The flip side of the coin is that by negating the normative value of the 
Court, the British promoted the value of the commission alone, provided that the British found 
any value in the discussion at all.107 Thus, the court and the commission are symbols wielded by 
actors. 
 Therefore, actors use language of hierarchy to discuss the relationship of the Council of 
Europe and the Convention to the UN and the UDHR, a description of axes to communicate 
                                                 
107 It can be assumed that any actor present thinks the deliberations have some value. 
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about rights’ substance, and the concepts of a court and a commission to debate the enforcement 
mechanism for the convention.  
These symbols were wielded by actors during the deliberations to coerce others’ belief 
structures and to their internal interest-formation processes. The next section analyzes these 
deliberations in light of the actors’ personalities, their source material, and the symbols they used 
to understand and influence one another.  
 
B. The deliberations 
 
The deliberations of the Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly, the Committee of 
Ministers, the Assembly’s Subcommittee on Legal and Administrative Questions, and the 
Minister’s Committee of Legal Experts were marked by a focus on conflict. Member state 
delegates didn’t discuss areas of consensus, but vociferously addressed sticky questions of the 
relationship of the region to the UN, the scope of protectable individual rights, and the 
enforcement mechanism of a regional convention.  
Symbols were used, debated and defined in the process. Until the actions of the UN 
caused a collective reaction within the Council, internal conflicts over the identity of normative 
value threatened to break the Council’s processes apart. This collective reaction coalesced 
member state opinion around pre-existing consensus that the delegates had taken for granted and 
motivated the Council to solve its internal conflicts. 
 




 The Convention was built under Statute of the Council of Europe’s treaty-making 
procedures within the Consultative Assembly and the Committees of Ministers and their 
subcommittees.108  The Consultative Assembly’s subcommittee was the Committee on Legal and 
Administrative Questions, comprised of 20 Assembly representatives from each state and chaired 
by Maxwell-Fyfe and Teitgen.109  The Committee of Ministers subcommittee was Committee of 
Experts on Human Rights, comprised of by professors and ministers from Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and 
the Netherlands and chaired by Mr. E. de la Vallee-Poussin of Belgium.110  The deliberations 
occurred in Paris and Strasbourg, where the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative 
Assembly met, respectively. The deliberations lasted from early 1949 until 4 November 1950. 
The discussion operated in English and French; non-native speakers brought translators. 
However, a few non-French-speaking delegates complained that they were prevented from 
engaging fully by the amount of French spoken.111 
Unlike the San Francisco Conference, larger states heard and respected smaller state 
opinion during the Council of Europe deliberations. Small states with delegates in the Committee 
of Legal affairs and the Committee of Experts were particularly influential in the process. 
Nonetheless, the architects of the Convention— Teitgen and Maxwell-Fyfe— individually had 
more control over the convention’s details, as points of confusion were directed to them. But, on 
a structural level, the final Court remained similar in form to the Legal Affairs Committee’s 
proposed structure, where small state delegates had a significant voice.  
 
                                                 
108 Statute of the Council of Europe, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/HTML/001.htm. Accessed 10 
January 2010. 
109Collected Editions. Vol. I. pp 162-164 
110Ibid. Vol. III. p. 252 






ii. Deliberative conflict 
These deliberations of the Council of Europe over the ECHR progressed through four 
stages of conflict.  
The first stage was the conflict between the Consultative Assembly and the Committee of 
Ministers over the Agenda for the Council of Europe. The two bodies disagreed over whether the 
Council of Europe should discuss human rights at the same time as the UN. The second stage of 
conflict was within the Consultative Assembly over the Convention's substance. The Assembly 
fundamentally disagreed about the included rights' scope and level of enumeration.112 This 
conflict culminated in the Committee of Ministers apparently rejecting the Assembly's draft by 
referring it to a Committee of Experts. The third and final stage of conflict was within this 
Committee of Experts over the Convention’s political purpose vis à vis the global human rights 
regime of the UN. This final conflict concluded when the Council reacted to the inaction of the 
UN's human rights regime.  
European regional opinion coalesced around the UN's inability to produce an effective 
enforcement mechanism for the UDHR. A consensus formed among the member states’ 
delegates that a regional court structure with the ability to evolve holds normative value. Thus, 
the ECtHR was created by actor’s internal perception of a conflict between the region’s and 
globe’s values. 
 
Three questions dominated the delegates’ deliberations. The first major question was to 
define the relationship between the Council of Europe’s human rights framework and that of the 
                                                 
112 The scope of rights means delimiting how far a right is protected, what limitations are available to states, and 
who is protected by a set of rights. The level of enumeration is whether this scope is written out, or if a right is left 
general to allow for future definition. 
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UN. The Committee of Ministers differed with the Consultative Assembly over this during the 
agenda-setting processes. Delegates within the Consultative Assembly disagreed with each other. 
The question reiterated in each organ until the UN Human Rights Commission was formally laid 
out without legally binding provisions in Lake Success, New York.113  
The second question was how specifically the European Convention on Human Rights 
should enumerate protected rights. Greater levels of enumeration constrain the ability of judges 
to interpret law into new cases while providing a clear meaning. This issue was raised in the 
Committee of Ministers’ discussion over the agenda,114 but arose more specifically and 
divisively in the meetings of the Committee of Legal Experts.115  
The third question was whether to enforce a collective guarantee for the protection of 
human rights, and how to do so: through a commission of human rights like the UN’s, by a new 
Court, or some third option. This discussion was formally raised in the agenda setting stages, but 
wasn’t finally decided until the UN’s inaction influenced regional opinion. 
 
I. The first stage: the agenda 
 
 Before the debate formally began there was conflict over it. Since the Committee of 
Minister controlled the Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly’s agenda at that time, 
conflicting definitions of worthy discussion could spark internal conflict between it and the 
Consultative Assembly.  
 The Committee of Ministers’ Preparatory Commission drafted an agenda for the 
Assembly that included the discussion of Human Rights definitions and protection in the Council 
                                                 
113 Collected Edition Vol. IV pp. 84-100 
114 Collected Edition Vol. I, p 10-12, quote at 10 
115Collected Edition  Vol. IV pp. 130-138 
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of Europe.116 When this reached the whole Committee of Ministers—12 members at the time— 
the Committee decided that the Assembly should not be invited to consider defining human 
rights since this action was already being settled in the UN.117 This decision was primarily 
advocated by the French and British delegates and was opposed only by the Danish and Irish 
delegations.118 
The Consultative Assembly protested this decision vehemently. Three proposals with 
over half of the Assembly’s signatures included a human rights convention on the agenda.119 
After the Committee of Ministers acquiesced, Churchill went so far as to rebuke the Committee 
of Ministers, “We attach great importance to this, Mr. President… A European Assembly 
forbidden to discuss human rights would indeed have been a ludicrous proposition to put to the 
world.”120 This sentiment was reiterated less succinctly by a series of speeches made by the rest 
of the Assembly.121 
For member states’ delegations to the Consultative Assembly, the deliberation and 
passage of a convention on human rights with definitions in addition to the UDHR was an 
important part of the post-war reconciliation processes. The subtext of the Assembly’s reaction, 
and what the members’ speeches seem to take for granted, was a belief that the regional-global 
relationship of the Council of Europe and the UN was not an ascending monist hierarchy but was 
two overlapping political forums for the discussion of peace-maintenance in international 
                                                 
116 See Collected Edition Vol. I, p 2-6 
117 Ibid, p 12 
118 Ibid p 10-12 
119 Ibid. p 14-16 
120 Ibid. p. 34 
121 Ibid. pp 20-36 
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affairs.122 Furthermore, the Council of Europe’s legitimacy as a regional political organization 
depended for many members on how it dealt with the issue of human rights.123  
The Committee of Ministers acquiesced on 13 August 1949 stating that the Universal 
Declaration lacked precision and probably could be refined. It also stated that it didn’t want to 
appear as if it were criticizing the Assembly.124 The Committee of Ministers did not, however, 
deny their original concerns about a dualist Council and Convention.125 Thus, while the 
Consultative Assembly determined that the relationship of the Council of Europe to the UN did 
not preclude a regional convention on human rights, the members of the Council remained 
skeptical.  
At this stage, most participants were mindful of the UN’s actions but believed that its 
processes were external to the Council of Europe. In their negative reaction to the Committee’s 
arguments, the member states’ delegations expressed a belief that the European Convention of 
Rights could co-exist with the UN’s UDHR in whatever form it took. This argument necessarily 
requires that regional organizations could and would operate parallel to global organizations. At 
this stage, member states believed that the UN was an external actor whose actions were 
tangential to the Council’s internal decision-making processes. 
                                                 
122 See for example, Collected Editions Vol I at p. 30 esp. Lord Layton 
123 Ibid. p 16-18, e.g. “M. Mollet (France): …Then it is necessary to give our Assembly and the Council of Europe 
some moral basis. Right from the outset- on the occasion, for example, of a discussion on the Court of Justice and on 
human rights- we could lay down the conditions which the countries belonging to what will, in the future, constitute 
Free Europe, are to apply, at home, the principles which they will by then have agreed to.” 
124 Ibid. p 24, esp. M. Lange (Norway) 
125 Ibid.  
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II. The second stage: substance 
Once placed on the Consultative Assembly’s Agenda, the Convention entered the Statute 
of the Council of Europe’s formal treaty-making processes. The Assembly began amid a plethora 
of proposals and speeches.126 Most proposals and speeches at the outset of the debate focused 
less on the specifics of the European Movement’s draft Convention than on the general 
principles that underlie it. Sometimes they didn’t bother.127 Proposals and speeches came from 
most member states, but the UK, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries were the most vocal.128  
In the beginning the Assembly learned from the troubles in the UN on creating an 
enforcement mechanism from a broad collection of rights, and focused on limiting the 
Convention’s rights to only those most commonly held. Therefore delegates agreed to 
summarize the individual rights existent in member state law rather than aspire to enforce new 
individual rights. After the first round of proposals, the Assembly expressed a belief that 
European member states wouldn’t ultimately agree to enforce the scope of rights included in the 
UDHR.129  
 
On 22 August 1949 the Consultative Assembly presented a series of questions to the 
Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions (“the Legal Affairs Committee”). 130 This 
Committee discussed the technical aspects the matter over the next two weeks.131  
                                                 
126 Collected Edition Vol. II. pp 36-154 
127 See particularly the row between the British Socialist delegate Mr. Nally and the British Conservative delegate 
Sir Ronald Ross on pp 144-154, which devolves from a theoretical debate into formal name-calling and personal 
attacks. This was an exception to the early debate, but is an example of the general philosophic and non-technical 
nature of the discussion. 
128 Ibid note 88 
129 Ibid. p. 44-46, 156, 160-162. 
130 Ibid. pp 156-162 
131 Ibid pp 162-238 
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Representatives from each state made, debated, and voted on proposals. Of the 75 
substantive motions made,132 delegates from France133 and England134 accounted for 31. The 
most active individual proposal-maker was Mr. Rolin of Belgium.135 He drafted 20 substantive 
motions alone or in part.  
In their motions, delegates to the Legal Affairs Committee adjusted the draft convention 
and proposed measures to guarantee individual rights through an intergovernmental court that 
protects the lowest common denominator of rights, broadly defined.136 Thus, the Legal Affairs 
Committee concluded that a convention that incorporated vague definitions of common rights, 
enforced by a legal body, held the greatest normative value for the Council, its member states, 
and its individual citizens.137  
The Legal Affairs Committee also proposed that the Court be both complementary to 
national courts and subordinate to the international justice system. In paragraph 23 of its 
proposal, the Legal Affairs Committee placed the court under the jurisdiction of the UN’s 
International Court of Justice.138 Individual complaints would not be adjudicated internationally 
until all national jurisdictions were exhausted.139  
The annex to the Legal Affairs Committee’s Report first included relevant provisions of 
the UDHR and secondly explained each proposal’s rationale. The Legal Affairs Committee used 
the proper location of protected rights along dual axes and the idea of a Court as its argument’s 
symbols. By using these symbols, the Legal Affairs Committee preconditioned states to the axes 
                                                 
132 Collected Edition Vol II. pp .170-214 
133 Ibid p 170;esp. MM Teitgen and Bastid 
134 Ibid; esp. MM Ungoed-Thomas and Layton 
135 Ibid.  
136 Ibid.. pp 164-214 
137 Ibid. p 216 
138 Ibid. p 226. “Anxious, however, not to set itself up in opposition either to European legal order and general 
international order… States concerned might also… refer a matter to the Court of International Justice.” 
139 Ibid. “The Commission shall not deal with an individual complaint until after the plaintiff has exhausted ‘all 
other means of redress within a State’.” 
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of rights, and invoked well-known symbols to inform the Assembly’s redrafting. The Legal 
Affairs Committee used these tools to argue that the best enforcement mechanism for individual 
rights would be a court with a limited jurisdiction. This expressed the Legal Committee 
member’s perception that a court would be more valuable than a commission, but a supranational 
court would not be acceptable to the sovereign member states. These conclusions were presented 
to the Assembly on 5 September 1949.140 The resolution was read in the full Assembly on 7 
September 1949. 
 
On 8 September the Assembly discussed the draft convention article by article and 
adjusted it as they went, mostly sticking to the Legal Committee’s design.141 The final draft 
convention was voted on at the end of the day and passed 64-1 with 21 abstentions.142 The 
Consultative Assembly’s draft included references to the UDHR143 and would create a jointly 
operating commission and court. Under the draft convention, individuals could apply for redress. 
The proposed structure was complementary to the UN and to national law, and defined a small 
number of rights. The Consultative Assembly’s vote and its draft convention were 
communicated to the Committee of Ministers for approval and ratification.  
 
When the Committee of Ministers met in private in Paris from 3-5 November 1949,144 
delegates to the Committee had a memorandum from Council of Europe Secretary General145 
                                                 
140 Collected Edition. Vol II  p. 216-226 
141 Ibid. 214-284 
142 Ibid p. 274. Unfortunately, this is only a summary of the vote, and so the full roll of how delegates from each 
state voted is not included in the Collected Edition. It is likely that this information is in the CoE’s archives, but I do 
not have access to it except in its catalog reference in the online archive catalog 
(http://lms.coe.int/uhtbin/cgisirsi/KPYojEOEUP/CENTRAL/127670005/9) 
143 Ibid. p 276 
144 Ibid.. pp 296-297. 
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Jacques Camille Paris containing the Assembly’s recommendation and a suggestion to convene a 
committee of legal experts from member states to draw up a Convention.146 The Committee of 
Ministers agreed unanimously to this recommendation and the Chairman of the Committee of 
Ministers, Gustav Rasmussen of Denmark, communicated the decision to the Assembly on 5 
November.147  
The Standing Committee of the Consultative Assembly replied on the 9th of November 
expressing the Assembly’s regret. It feared that the Committee of Experts might ignore the work 
already done by the Assembly. In its reply, the Standing Committee of the Consultative 
Assembly stated that it “sees no objection to this question being remitted to a committee of 
lawyers for study.... The Committee fears that to defer the matter until a decision is taken by the 
United Nations would mean that the proposal would merely be pigeonholed.”148  
Again, the Assembly’s and the Committee of Ministers’ internal identities constructed the 
relationship between the UN and the Council of Europe differently. Again, the interactions of the 
two bodies reflected the Council of Europe’s lack of consensus on the relationship between 
regional and global identities. 
                                                                                                                                                             
145 Statute of the Council of Europe, see note 107 Chapter VI, Articles 36 and 37. The Secretariat is the 
administrative/bureaucratic arm of the Council who is the intermediary for the Consultative Assembly and the 
Committee of Ministers. 
146 Collected Edition. Vol. II. p 288, “2. Should the Committee of Ministers approve the above recommendation in 
principle, the Secretary General would suggest… to convene a meeting of experts from Member State with a view to 
drawing up a draft Convention, which may be used as a basis for later discussions by the Committee on this 
question.” 
147 Ibid. p 297. “Le Comité des Ministres… a decide de charger le Secrétaire Général d’inviter chacun des 
gouvernements des Etats membres à désigner une personnalité qualifiée pour siéger dans une commission qui sera 
chargée d’élaborer le projet d’une Convention pouvant server de base aux discussions ultérieures du Comité sur 
cette question, tout en tenant compte du progrès fait dans la matière par les organs competent des Nations Unies.” 
148 Ibid. p 300.  
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On 18 November 1949, the Secretary General formally convened the Committee of Legal 
Experts to sit in February 1950 and draft a Convention on human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, mindful of the work done by the Assembly.149 
 
III.  The third stage: conflict 
 
Before the committee sat, the Secretary General prepared a series of working papers 
which included the European Movement’s draft, the Consultative Assembly’s draft, their 
attending reports, jurisprudence of the PCIJ, reports on international law conferences, reports 
from the UN, reports from the Cambridge Institute on International Law and Harvard law school, 
and comments by member state governments on the draft UN covenant (being discussed at Lake 
Success at the time).150 The Committee of Legal Experts took two mandates and a ream of 
papers and discussed the proposed convention from 2-8 February and 6-10 March, 1950.151 
Right from the outset of the discussion, two schools of thought emerged. These two 
schools contested the normative value of the rights definition’s two axes. The first school 
appealed to state interests and relied on the assumption that state interest structure need to be 
able to accurately predict the full effect of a provision before accepting it. The other school relied 
on building member state interest in human right protection gradually by initially defining rights 
vaguely and allowing the rights room to develop.152 
                                                 
149 Collected Edition. Vol. II, p 302-4 
150 Collected Edition. Vol. III pp. 2-178 
151 Ibid. pp. 180-182. 
152 Ibid. pp 182-232 
60 
 
The first school, led by the British and Dutch experts, believed the draft Conventions was 
too vague and therefore unenforceable.153 They focused on a pragmatic analysis of contemporary 
state interests. 
 Member State delegates need a sufficient definition of rights, they said, to know whether 
or not their state could fulfill potential convention obligations.154 They advocated that the 
Council of Europe refine the draft convention’s language by using the tailoring processes 
ongoing in the UN Commission on Human Rights. Fundamentally, this school claimed that a 
rigid and easily identifiable list of specifically defined rights held normative value for its ability 
to clearly express potential obligations to interested, non-signatory states.  
The other school, led by French, Belgian, and Dutch delegates believed that the 
Assembly draft was adequate for the Council’s purposes. They focused on an institutional 
analysis of how international organizations internally operate. 
A full enumeration would take too long to do and the refining process couldn’t produce 
an enforceable institution, they argued, because the consensus-building process would be overly 
burdensome. They proposed a ‘Strasbourg System’ of human rights protection, which creates an 
incomplete, but legally sufficient, convention in order to build an effective institution. The 
institution could then gradually refine the conventions rights’ definitions through its 
jurisprudence.155 Fundamentally, they advocated a system of general rights that are immediately 
acceptable to all parties. Flexible institutions with legal jurisdictions could reflect changing 
concepts of rights and uphold shifting norms. 
The two schools could not decide singularly or jointly whether the enforcement 
mechanism of the Convention should include a court. Since this was ultimately a political 
                                                 
153 Collected Edition Vol. III. 182-4 
154 Ibid. p 234 
155 Ibid. pp 256-258 
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question, they determined the conclusion of the matter inappropriate for their own decision-
making authority.156 
These two schools proposed enough contradictory amendments throughout the 
Committee of Legal Expert’s meetings to warrant the production of four alternative versions of 
the Convention.157 They organized these four alternatives under two titles (see diagram 8) and 
communicated them to the Committee of Ministers for their decision. 
Diagram 8. Alternatives Proposed by the Committee of Legal Affairs158 
  H.R. Articulation 
  Broad Specific 
Comm & 




Court A (2) B (2) 
 
The full Committee of Ministers' comparison of the four alternatives began with each 
member state stating its government’s position. 
The UK delegation sided with Alternative B and proposed the full definition of rights 
prior to signing the convention for the stated purpose of an immediately effective structure.159 
Ireland opposed this, stating that the principle aim of the Council of Europe was to prevent any 
repetition of the recent past. Ireland then advocated the Assembly’s first position and for 
Alternative A.160 The Netherlands argued for Alternative B because it thought Europe didn't need 
more general statements and A added nothing to the UDHR. France advocated A, “not because it 
                                                 
156 Collected Edition Vol. IV. P16-18 
157 Ibid. pp 278-334.  
158 Ibid. p 18 
159 Ibid. p 106 
160 Ibid. p.108 
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[was] the path of least resistance,” but because it thought the convention ought to add an 
institution to enforce human rights already established in national legal systems.161  Italy 
expressed support for Alternative A to align the regional convention with the already legitimated 
UDHR.162 Norway then supported alternative B because the nature of the obligations imposed 
requires precise definitions to avoid vagary. Next, Greece was explicitly noncommittal. Turkey, 
stated its preference for A because it was slightly more expansive than B. Belgium and 
Luxembourg followed suit, although in the committee of experts the Belgian and 
Luxembourgian experts fought for greater precision.  
After these general statements the representatives discussed whether or not there should 
be a commission and a court, or just a commission. The Netherlands, the UK, Norway, Greece, 
Turkey were either against a court, solely for the commission, or wanted the potential powers of 
both clarified.163 France, Italy, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Denmark advocated for a court to 
exist in the structure proposed by the “Strasbourg System.”  
All of these general statements addressed the symbols of the court and the axes of rights. 
However, relevant provisions which typically cause a great deal of discussion were not 
addressed. For example, the issue of whether an individuals and states or if only states can 
engage the institutions was not discussed. Also, once the court’s jurisdiction was identified as 
complementary it became a courts’ sine qua non.  
The statements made by member states therefore reflected the debate’s structure, and 
concentrated on locating rights’ bounds and the existence of a court. They did not focus on issues 
where consensus was preexisting or previously established. 
                                                 
161 Collected Edition Vol IV pp. 108-110 
162 Ibid. p. 110 
163 Ibid pp 114-8 
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The UN’s failure to create a Covenant on Human Rights with individual application in 
June 1950 rallied the Council of Europe's member states around this shared value. The European 
member states’ shared reaction provided a motivating consensus that drove the debate thereafter. 
It became obvious to delegates that if the UN had denied the right of individual access to global 
institutions, then Europe would have to do so for itself. 
British and Dutch proposals advocating the UN’s processes became implicitly tainted in 
member state’s speeches, and the members of the first school were socially coerced into 
grudgingly allowing the deliberations to move on using Alternative B (1).164 
 
iii. Constitution and post-constitution 
 
The final convention included rights regarding the individual, family, and individual legal 
rights while it excluded socio-economic, political, cultural, and educational rights. It did not 
reference the location of its rights within the UDHR. The process that identified the ECHR’s 
provisions diluted the influence of the French/British leadership further, as other nations’ 
delegates equally argued and affected the inclusion, exclusion, and definition of certain rights.165  
A major facet of the final text was the inclusion of the non-self destructive clause of 
UDHR’s Article 30 in Article 17, 166 which, as Teitgen explained, allows for the institution to 
                                                 
164 Grudgingly as in by reserving a right to voice reservations later on. Collected Edition. Vol. IV pp 130-8 
165 Collected Edition Vol. IV and V 
166 UDHR. Article 30: “Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 
rights and freedoms set forth herein.” 
ECHR Article 17: “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 




provoke gradual positive change without falling backwards through providing institutional 
flexibility. This clause was also stated without acknowledging the UN’s UDHR.  
Immediately after the Convention was passed, the Standing Committee, the Consultative 
Assembly and the Secretariat began work on the first protocol. The first protocol included socio-
economic and educational rights, which were not included in the 1950 Convention due to 
internal conflict causing delays. Consensus over these rights developed in late 1951 and early 
1952, and the protocol was enacted on 20 March 1952.167 
Since the first protocol, 13 more have passed through the Council. The Council of 
Europe’s member states have ratified all of these 14 protocols.168 Seven protocols are substantive 
changes or additions to the individual rights protected by the Court. Six protocols changed the 
procedure and structure of Court and, formerly, the Commission. The commission was 
disbanded in the 11th protocol, which was passed in 1998.169  
The most recent constitutional adjustment to the Convention occurred on 18 February 
2010, when the Duma of the Russian Federation ratified the 14th Protocol and allowed the 
ECtHR to make procedural changes. These changes were formulated to streamline the case 
selection process by loosening complaint-rejection requirements.170 The Court will conceivably 
make more landmark decisions, which domestic courts can then implement into their 
jurisprudence.  
The protocols make the court more like a supreme court of appeals. Should an individual 
exhaust national and then supranational courts, s/he may then resort to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction 
                                                 
167 Collected Edition Vol. VII 
168 The Council of Europe. “Recent News” Accessed last 21February 2010 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/v3News.asp, 
169 The Council of Europe. “Summary of Protocol 11” Accessed last 2 May 2010 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/155.htm.  
170 See note 168 
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as his/her last hope for redress. However, to understand the protocol process and the courts 
development since its creation, we must explore how it operates.  
 
C.  Conclusions: denouement 
 
Prior to the ECtHR’s foundation, the collective identification of internal consensus 
through a shared reaction to an external action ameliorated member state conflict. Once the UN 
disappointed member states, their delegates could agree on what the Council of Europe’s 
relationship was to be with the United Nations, how generally to articulate rights in the 
convention, and what mechanism to protect these rights with. The symbols that actors used to 
communicate ideas and coerce each other, and the conflict that these communications resulted in, 
tangentially allowed for consensus to be built on symbols that were taken for granted in the 
discussion. Therefore, the Council of Europe member states signed the ECHR in 1950 having 
made a complementary judiciary to protect a general enumeration of a limited number of rights 
for the individual European citizen. 
  
 This section has attempted to show what member states perceived as the Courts telos 
during its creation. It identified the internal conflicts of the Council of Europe and showed that 
consensus was reached through a collective reaction to external action. The common identity of 
the region formed the court, and imbued it with an identity. The next section examines what the 
Court itself did with this identity. It identifies the doctrines and tests the Court wielded to define 
its role in the European region, and then describes the developmental processes that preceded the 
Court’s contemporary identity. 
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ii. What it does: The court’s functional telos171 
 The European Court of Human Rights has a great deal of case law behind it. Though 
applications were less frequent before 1989, the court still managed to build a robust case law 
before the Berlin Wall fell.172 This case law expresses the Court’s internal belief, constructed by 
its judges and personnel, that the Court’s jurisdiction is subordinate to national courts in 
politically contentious areas. It expresses this belief through the development of doctrines and 
tests. 
The Court has developed the “margin of appreciation” and the proportionality tests to 
define its relationship to its member states. Through these symbols, the court has created a 
system to bind the outer limits of the Court’s interpretative capabilities by deferring to states 
when interpreting issues of social morality. Specifically it applies these tests to cases dealing 
with the limitation clauses of Articles 8-11 which protect the individual’s freedom of privacy, 
home, thought, conscience, religion, expression, and association.173   
By deferring a margin of appreciation to the states, the Court originally set itself as a 
complement of national courts that only claims jurisdiction when national courts fail to protect a 
minimum standard. The interpretations of the Court have gradually narrowed each symbol’s 
deferential meaning, but their usage still expresses the courts’ self-identification as a 
complementary to national courts. 
 
                                                 
171 All ECHR case law can be found on the COE’s database, HUDOC at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?sessionid=43727640&skin=hudoc-en. Accessed first 17 October 2009. 
172 Ovey, Clare and Robin C.A. White, Jacobs & White, The European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 435-436. Matscher, Franz, Ronald St. J. Macdonald, and Herbert 
Petzold, eds. The European System for the Protection of Human Rights(Boston, Massachusetts: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1993) at the Introduction 
173 ECHR Article 8.2, 9.2, 10.2, 11.2: “…except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.” 
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A. The context of the court 
Under the ECHR, individuals and member states can apply to the Court’s jurisdiction. 
However, interstate complaints have been rare. Most of the Court’s dockets come from 
individuals accusing a member state of violations. The courts’ judges are appointed to it by 
member states, and organized internally into chambers. The Council of Europe enforces the 
Court’s decisions, though member states generally comply with Strasbourg’s rulings of their own 
volition. The actors who operate inside the court are individual judges and administrators. The 
actors who operate externally to the court are states, individuals, and the various organizations 
that states and individuals can represent (i.e. corporations, NGO’s, the European Union, etc.) 
The socially constructed symbols that individuals and the Court use to communicate 
about normative values in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence are doctrines and tests, which judges 
develop and apply. This paper focuses on the margin of appreciation doctrine and its 
proportionality tests. By developing these tests, the Court communicates its regional identity 
internally to its judges and externally to its member states and their leaders. When multiple 
judges applied the margin of appreciation at different moments, therefore, they reflected how the 
Court’s identity-formation processes function.  
 
B. The Court’s Jurisprudence 
 
The Court’s Jurisprudence began in the 1950’s, and the Court operates today. 
Applications prior to the Berlin Wall’s fall were sparser to the period since the fall, but this did 
not preclude the Court from building a robust case law.  
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Compared to similar regional human rights courts, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ rights, the ECtHR is more established. This 
greater establishment reflects the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of its member states, and 
their adherence to its jurisdiction is likely its effect. This section examines the development of 
the margin of appreciation to identify how the Court established itself in the region, and what 
form the Court exists in today. 
 Doctrines developed in the Court’s jurisprudence through a three-stage process. First the 
doctrine or symbol was named and recognized.  Second, the doctrine was defined. Third, the 
doctrine was applied, and issues with the identity and definition of the doctrine or test was 
corrected as necessary. This section studies the margin of appreciation through these 
developmental stages. 
 
i. The margin of appreciation174 
 
The margin of appreciation doctrine and the proportionality tests developed to implement 
it are symbols that the Court uses to defer to member state jurisdictions by subject area. Where 
public morals are at issue, the Court can use the symbol to dodge the question and allow member 
states to tackle the issue internally. By doing so, the Court communicates to its member states, to 
individuals, and to itself a ‘subordinate-to-states’ identity.  
                                                 
174 Most cases cited below were found through the guidance of three sources, to whose authors I’m indebted: Arai-
Takahashi, Yutaka. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence 
of the ECHR. (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2001); Mowbray, Alastair. Cases and Materials on the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Second Edition (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Ovey, Clare and  Robin 




 The doctrine was formally identified in the Handyside case. The Court developed the 
proportionality tests prior to the identification of the margin of appreciation in cases of member 
states violating the ECHR during times of emergency (Article 15). After Handyside, the Court 




 In the 1976 Handyside case,175 the Court first explicitly identified the margin of 
appreciation as a balance of individual rights and state authorities under the Article 8-11 
limitation clauses. These clauses determine that a state action may be permitted if it is “necessary 
for a free and democratic society.”176 The doctrine was transliterated from the French Conseil 
d’Etat’s domestic doctrine, ‘la marge nationale d’appreciation,’177 which allows the government 
a degree of moral leeway in its actions.  
The issue in Handyside was The Little Red Schoolbook, a book written and published in 
Denmark. The book, with contributions from children and teachers, included a section regarding 
sex. It specifically discussed abortion, homosexuality, intercourse, and masturbation.178 The 
applicant was a publisher who produced several thousand copies of The Little Red Schoolbook 
which the London metropolitan police confiscated and destroyed under the authority of the 
Obscene Publications Act of 1959. The applicant was then levied a fine by the state. The 
applicant appealed the fine and requested compensation for the destruction of the books within 
                                                 
175 Handyside v. United Kingdom A.24 (1976) 1 EHRR 737 (“Handyside”) 
176 ECHR Article 8.2, 9.2, 10.2, 11.2: “…except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.” 
177 Mowbray, Alastair. Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights. Second Edition 
(Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2007). P 630 
178 Ibid. Para. 1 
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national jurisdiction. When British courts rejected his claims, the applicant brought the case to 
the ECHR under the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR.179  
The Court found no violation of the Convention by the UK government. It ruled in part 
that the  margin of appreciation allows states “to give an opinion on the exact content of [moral] 
requirements [where no European standard exists], as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ 
or ‘penalty’ intended to meet them”180 It accepted that “Article 10 §2 does not give the 
Contracting States [STET] an unlimited power of appreciation… ,” but leaves the establishment 
of that test for later cases. Instead the Court undergoes a textual analysis of so-called ‘clawback’ 
or ‘accommodation’ clauses of other legal structures to balance the states and the individuals 
interests.181 
The Court eventually used this textual analysis’ balance of interests focus to build the 




The definition of the margin of appreciation’s balancing exercise predates Handyside’s 
application of the term to the Article 8-11 limitation clauses. Cases over the 1950’s Cyprus 
                                                 
179 Article 10  ECHR– Freedom of expression 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article 
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, 
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
180 Handyside, supra n. 175 Para 48 
181 Arai-Takahashi, Yutaka. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR. (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2001). p 8 
71 
 
conflict ostensibly invoked the first proportionality tests.182 The United Kingdom invoked the 
Article 15 “derogation in times of public emergencies” clause183 to argue that, as a state, the UK 
had a “certain measure of discretion in assessing the extent strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation.”184 The Court agreed and ruled in the UK’s favor in part because state governments 
are better equipped than the Court to identify the extent and existence of an emergency. This 
concept was reaffirmed during the Northern Ireland conflict in the cases Lawless v Ireland185 and 
Ireland v UK.186  
The conceptual movement of deference to state discretion from Article 15 into other 
Articles187 began in the Belgian Linguistic case. 188 In this case French speakers accused the 
Belgian government of discriminatory treatment in its disparate funding of Dutch- and French-
speaking public schools.189 The Court implicitly used the margin of appreciation doctrine to rule 
that the Belgian government was not in violation of Article 8 or Article 2 of the First Protocol 
because states have certain discretion in securing the ECHR’s measures. The Court recognized 
that a discriminatory violation on the basis of educational language could be possible, just not in 
the Belgian Linguistic case.190 
                                                 
182 Greece v. UK (Cyprus case), No. 176/56, (1958-9) 2 Ybk 174 
183 Article 15 of the ECHR, 
 «In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take 
measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.” 
184 See note 182 at 176 
185 Lawless v Ireland, Series B (1960-1) 
186 Ireland v UK, Judgment of 18 January 1978, A 25 
187 As opposed to rights that can never be legitimately limited: Article 2 (right to life), prohibition of torture (Article 
3), prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 4), and freedom from ex post facto laws (Article 7). 
188 Belgian Linguistic Case, Commission’s Report of 24 June 1965, B 3 
189 ECHR Protocol I, Paris, 20.III.1952 Article 2—Right to education, “No person shall be denied the right to 
education. IN the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall 
respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions.” 
190 See note 185, at 307, Para 401. Also, contrary to footnote 21, p 6 in Takahashi it also appears there that a 
majority of the court expressly considers art. 14 (prohibition of discrimination on the basis of language) as a 
potential location for a violation, but determines that this discrimination is balanced by the legitimate aim of the 
state to promote linguistic unity for the sake of the public interest. 
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The Court moved the margin of appreciation doctrine further away from Article 15 
emergency claims in the Vagrancy case.191 Under Belgian vagrancy laws, three separate 
prisoners who had claimed or had been identified as vagrants were unable to correspond freely 
with employers, family, and welfare officers while in prison due to their incarceration. They 
were also required to work in prison until they saved 4,000 Belgian Francs for release.192 Elderly 
persons, under these laws, were detained in an assistance home until ready and able to leave. 
Since they were effectively prisoners of the state, the applicants claimed that the Belgian state 
violated ECHR Articles 4, 5, and 8 (the freedom from forced servitude, the right to liberty and 
security of person, and the right to privacy).193   
The Court found that, although the Belgian government had legitimate reasons to control 
prisoners’ correspondence under Article 8 on account of its “power of appreciation,”194 the 
vagrancy laws themselves were violations of the ECHR Articles 4 and 5. Since the case applied 
the margin of appreciation into the limitation clause of Article 8, it also opened the door for the 
margin’s application to parallel provisions in Articles 9-11 of the ECHR. 
The proportionality tests that the Court incorporated into the margin of appreciation 
doctrine in ECHR Articles 8-11 were paralleled from Article 15 ‘times of emergency’ cases. The 
Court successfully applied these tests to more mundane issues, and the proportionality tests were 
applicable to more than just emergency situation cases. 195  
                                                 
191 De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp v Belgium (Vagrancy Case), Judgment of 18 June 1971, A 12. 
192 Ibid, Para 18-21. 
193 Ibid, Para 25, 41 
194 Ibid, Para 93 
195 See, for instance: Wille v. Liechtenstein, Judgment of 28 October 1999; Rekvéni v Hungary, Judgment of 20 May 
1999; Funke v France, Judgment of 25 February 1993, A 256, Para. 55; Olsson v Sweden (No. 1), Judgment of 24 
March 1988, A 130; Silver and Others v United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 March 1983, A 61, Para 97; Sunday 
Times v UK (no 1), Judgment of 26 April 1979, A 30; Klass and Others v Germany, Judgment of 6 September 1978, 
A 28, Para 42. 
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Thus, when these tests were codified in Handyside as the ‘margin of appreciation,’ they 
applied connotations of balancing the interests of a well-meaning government and collaterally 
affected individuals to the symbol. The margin of appreciation doctrine assumed a well-
intentioned government and individuals, and took their conflict as an accident. This exercise of 
balancing individual and social harms defined the margin appreciation for the Court. The Court, 
using the margin of appreciation, could ask some questions, but not others; and so, it developed 
the symbol along some lines, but not others.  
Whether the connection between accidental collateral damage and the limitation clauses 
of ECHR Articles 8-11 was a reflection of a preexisting social identity or was a new 
phenomenon constructed by the Court, its identification fundamentally shaped the margin of 
appreciation’s interpretative possibilities. 
 
III.  Application 
 
The Court refined the scope of the margin of appreciation more often in Article 8-11 
limitation clause cases than in Article 15 derogation cases. Articles 8-11’s limitation clauses’ 
language are functionally equivalent and the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine is 
uniform across the Articles.196 Initially, the court used the doctrine to tacitly accept a separation 
between the Court and the member states in cases that the Court perceived had resulted from a 
governmental action’s collateral injury of an individual’s rights.197  
The court developed a three pronged test to apply the margin of appreciation doctrine to 
cases of governmental interference of rights protected by ECHR Article 8-11 and Article 2 of the 
                                                 
196 Silver and Others v UK, note 66, at Para 85 
197 O’Donnell, Thomas. “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights” (1982) 4 Human Rights Quarterly 474 at 496. 
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Fourth Protocol. First, the Court examines whether the interference is “in accordance with 
law”198 or “prescribed by law.”199 Second, the Court examines if the interference pursues the 
legitimate aims explicitly mentioned in the ECHR Articles 8-11s’ second paragraphs. Third, the 
Courts tests whether the measure is considered “necessary in a democratic society.”200  
The following subsections examine each of these three tests to determine how the Court 
applies the margin of appreciation to cases where individuals challenge states. It shows that the 
Court’s usage of the margin of appreciation has gradually narrowed the scope of its initial 
symbolic meaning, but the doctrine is still a powerful tool used to subordinate the Court’s 
jurisdiction to state authority. 
 
a. Prescribed by national law 
 
In 1979, the Court determined in Sunday Times that a governmental interference must 
satisfy two conditions to be considered ‘prescribed by [national] law.’201 First, the law must be 
accessible to citizens. Second, the law must be sufficiently precise so that its scope and meaning 
are foreseeable by a citizen. Since the Sunday Times decision, this requirement remained 
unchanged until the early 1990’s, at which point the Court refined the forseeability requirement 
and made it easier for individual to claim state violations. 
Under the Sunday Times definition of this test, an accessible law doesn’t need to be 
codified or widely published. A law can accessible to citizens if an individual has reasonable 
                                                 
198 Article 8, para 2; Article 2 of the Fourth Protocol, para 3 
199 Article 9, para 2; Article 10, para 2; Article 11, para 2 
200 See, for instance, Wille v. Liechtenstein, Judgment of 28 October 1999, para 55 and 56. 
201 See Sunday Times v UK (no 1), Judgment of 26 April 1979, A 30 
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access to legal advice from an expert. Common law traditions that rely on the development of 
precedents are not therefore discriminated against under the forseeability aspect of this test.  
In Chorherr v. Austria, the Court refined the forseeability aspect further, and provided a 
vague tri-partite test of legislation for judges to delineate how strictly to apply forseeability 
standards. 202  The Court first examines the context of the law, the law’s subject area, and the 
number and the status of the affected citizens (e.g. if it addresses a minority group). The Court 
then determines whether a citizen could reasonably identify these classifications with legal aid.  
And finally whether a citizen with legal aid could deduce what might happen to the individual if 
the individual violated the law. This standard is therefore based on a rational analysis of the 
restriction’s predictability,203 and since its application has been difficult for defendant states to 
overcome.204 This is offset by the fact that the application of the forseeability test is sparse. 
 
b. Legitimate aims 
 
The Court has found only a few cases where a Government lacked a legitimate aim.205 No 
test really exists to determine whether an aim is legitimate or not. Presumably a judge conducts a 
rational analysis of the government’s position.  
The list of governmental aims that the Court has accepted as legitimate include national 
security,206 territorial integrity,207 the interests of public safety,208 economic well-being of the 
                                                 
202 Chorherr v. Austria, Judgment of 25 August 1993, A 266-B, reaffirmed in Kalaç v Turkey, Commission’s Report 
of 27 February 1996. 
203 See Kalaç v Turkey, para 41 et seq. 
204 Arai-Takahashi, Yutaka. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR. (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2001). p. 11 
205 In my reading I only found one: Darby v Sweden, Judgment of 23 October 1990, A 187. at para 25-26— a case 
over a Church tax of a little over 3,000 kroner; about $533 in 1990. I assume there are others that weren’t interesting 
enough to be published. 
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country, 209the prevention of disorder or crime,210 protection of health or morals,211 the protection 
of the rights or freedoms of others,212 the prevention of confidential information disclosure,213 
and maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.214 Thus, the legitimate aim test in 
its application has not been changed but has been institutionalized. 
 
c. Necessary in a democratic society 
 
 The Court has a more ambiguous time determining whether a state’s interference for a 
legitimate aim is necessary than if the interference is indeed for a legitimate aim. The Court’s 
textual analysis in Silver in 1981 shows that judges interpret the phrase “necessary in a 
democratic society” to mean that “…to be compatible with the Convention, the interference 
must, inter alia, correspond to a ‘pressing social need’ and be ‘proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued.’”215 Thus, the Court at this time identified a two part test to determine necessity. 
 The first part is whether the interference corresponds to a pressing social need by 
determining whether the national authority shows such a need. The Court has uniformly allowed 
                                                                                                                                                             
206 Zana v Turkey, Judgment of 25 November 1997, 27 EHRR 667; Klass v Germany, Judgment of 6 September 
1978,  A 28; Rekvényi v Hungary Judgment of 20 May 1999, 30 EHRR 519. 
207 Zana v Turkey ibid. at para 49 
208 Rekvényi v Hungary,  see note 78, at para 41; X and Y v Switzerland, 3 October 1978, 13 DR 241; Buckley v 
United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 September 1996 23 EHRR 101 
209 Miailhe v France, Judgment of 25 February 1993, A 256-C; Funke v France see note 66 
210 Otto-Preminger Institute v Germany Judgment of 20 September 1994, A 295 
211 Handyside supra n. 175 
212 Otto-Preminger see note 209; Jacubowski v Germany, Judgment of 23 June 1994, A 291 
213 Weber v Switzerland Judgment of 22 May 1990, A 177; Observer and Guardian v United Kingdom, Judgment of 
26 November 1991, A 216; Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 2), Judgment of 26 November 1991, A 217 
214 News Verlags GmbH and CoKG v Austria, Judgment of 11 April 2000, 31 EHRR 246; Schöpfer v Switzerland, 
Judgment of 28 October 1999, 33 EHRR 845; Wille v. Leichtenstein, see note 66 
215 Silver and Others v United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 March 1983, A 61, at para 97 
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states a wide degree of latitude to determine social needs and rarely challenges a states’ 
analysis.216  
 The second part of the test is the proportionality test, which asks whether the interference 
is proportional by balancing the government’s expressed social needs with the law’s collateral 
damage to individual rights. This test historically required the greatest amount of refinement by 
the Court.217  
The court applies the proportionality test by answering four questions: Who has the 
burden of proof? Is there a less restrictive alternative? What happens in other states? And, does 
the court really want to open this door?218  
Judges’ answers to these questions express four identifiable types of usage for the margin 
of appreciation doctrine. Arai-Takahashi labels these usages as the: relevant and sufficient 
method, the less-restrictive approach, the comparative-evolutive method, and the rhetorical usage 
approach.219 
 
1. Who has the burden of proof? The relevant and sufficient method 
 
In a burden of proof analysis, the Court determines which party must prove a law’s 
(dis)proportionality and what evidentiary standard it must meet to do so.  
                                                 
216 See, Handyside  at para 50; and Dudgeon v United Kingdom, Judgment of 22 October 1981, A 45, para 45. 
217 Mowbray, Alastair. Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights. Second Edition 
(Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2007) p 630 
218 Leander v Sweden, Judgment of 26 March 1987, A 116; Olsson v Sweden (No. 2), Judgment of 27 November 
1992, A 250; Gillow v United Kingdom, Judgment of 24 November 1986 A 109; Handyside, supra note 175; X and 
Y v Netherlands, Judgment of 26 March 1985, A 91; Z v Finland, Judgment of 25 February 1997; Dudgeon v United 
Kingdom, Judgment of 22 October 1981, A 45 
219 Arai-Takahashi, Yutaka. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 




In the beginning of the Court’s margin of appreciation usage, the onus was placed on the 
applicant to show that the national law was disproportionate.220 However, the Court determined 
between the 1960’s and the late 1980’s that the respondent state must defend its law in cases 
which potentially involve a “serious affront to Convention rights and values.”221 
 These potentially serious affronts include: interference with letters between a counsel 
and the defendant (1986), 222  encroachments on an individual’s sexuality223 or discrimination 
based on gender (1985-1999),224 discrimination against children birthed out of wedlock 
(1987),225 or derogations from the Convention due to exigent circumstances (1959-1978).226 In 
determining what constitutes a potentially serious affront to the Convention, the Court expresses 
a greater willingness to place the onus on its member states. 
In determining evidentiary standards, the court relies on a “relevant and sufficient” test. 
This test determines the level of proof necessary for an applicant or defendant to make their case. 
These levels range from rational proof, convincing or compelling reasons, or beyond all 
reasonable doubt.227 The Court historically applies standards based on the severity of the 
potential harm done by the discrimination. For example, the regulation of commercial speech is 
reviewed under a “justifiable in principle” standard,228 while a court order requiring a journalist 
to reveal confidential sources is reviewed under the strict scrutiny of the beyond all reasonable 
                                                 
220 Handyside at para 48 
221 Arai-Takahashi, Yutaka. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR. (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2001), p 90 
222 Schönenberger and Durmz v Switzerland, Commission’s Report of 12 December 1986, A 137;  
223 X and Y v Netherlands, Judgment of 26 March 1985, A 91; Dudgeon v UK, Judgment of 27 September 1999; 
Smith and Grady v. UK, Judgment of 27 September 1999 
224 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK, Judgment of 28 May 1985, A 94; Burghartz v Switzerland, Judgment 
of 22 February 1994, A 280-B 
225 Inze v Austria, Judgment of 28 October 1987, A 126 
226 Lawless v Ireland, No. 332/57, Commission’s Report of 19 December 1959,  B 332; The Greek case, (1969), 12 
Ybk (The Greek Case), p. 72; Ireland v UK, Judgment of 18 January 1978,  A 25 
227 To oversimplify into a quantifiable example: rational:  >50% proven; convincing and compelling:  66.67% 
proven; and  beyond all reasonable doubt: >89% proven 
228 Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v Germany, Judgment of 20 November 1989, A 165 
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doubt standard.229 The Court differentiates these by whether a regulation has a “potentially 
chilling effect” on an individual’s ability to express their own rights.230   
Historically the Court has not fundamentally changed its application of evidentiary 
standards in relation to member states or individuals. The Court has expressed a greater 
willingness to require the states to bear the burden of proof by defining serious affronts to the 
ECHR more broadly than before. Thus, the Courts’ usage of this method expresses only that the 
Court tends to view itself as categorically more important.  
 
2. Is there a less restrictive alternative?  
 
The less restrictive approach to proportionality is considered the most stringent forms of 
the proportionality test by commentators.231 It examines the breadth of a state’s legitimate 
interference and compares it to less sweeping measures that may be sufficient to attain the same 
legitimate aim. If a less sweeping measure exists, the Court strikes down the original law and 
suggests the alternative.  
The Court began to use this relative method of determining proportionality in the late 
1980’s and 1990’s. It applied this method to cases addressing restrictions on assemblies for 
                                                 
229 Goodwin v UK, Judgment of 27 March 1996, A 544 
230 Ibid. para 42-46. This chilling effect is examined in depth in Arai-Takahashi in relation to multiple articles’ case 
law. It basically entails that some types of State interference with an individual right (particularly expression and 
association) may threaten the forum in which that right operates, undercutting the right all together, regardless of the 
state’s intended and usually unrelated purpose.  
More concretely, in Goodwin the court ruled at para 39 that a court-order to make a journalist reveal their 
sources could undermine “the vital public-watchdog role of the press… and the ability of the press to provide 
accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected. Having regard to the importance of the protection of 
journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society and the potentially chilling effect an order of source 
disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom, such a measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 (art. 10) of the 
Convention unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest”  
231 Arai-Takahashi, Yutaka. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECtHR. (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2001), p 15 
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security and order (1980),232 prisoner’s correspondence (1982),233 a statute of limitations on 
paternity proceedings (1984),234 rules preventing free speech for the purposes of preventing the 
defamation of government (1992),235 rules preventing the incitement of disorder (1995),236 rules 
preventing free speech for the purposes of national security (1998),237 the dissolution of a party 
for national security (1998),238 and the discriminatory treatments of homo- or trans-sexuals 
(1999).239 The court seems unwilling to use this doctrine in cases regarding property rights (rent 
controls, license revocation, property tax levying, etc.).240 That is, The ECtHR was unwilling to 
apply a margin of appreciation in cases over which the European Communities’ had regional 
competence. 
In applying a less-restrictive approach to the margin of appreciation, the Court overturned 
state law to impose more precise restrictions that accomplished the stated legitimate aims of the 
state. This approach is a compromise approach for the Court: it allows the Court to legitimately 
coerce states in the protection of human rights while simultaneously acknowledging the states’ 
margin of appreciation. In effect, the less-restrictive approach is the Court’s modern tool for a 
conciliatory repudiation. 
The Court’s development of this approach in the 1990’s expressed its willingness to 
encroach into state sovereignty. By co-opting the margin of appreciation and using it to suggest 
                                                 
232 Christians against Racism and Fascism v UK, Decision of 16 July 1980, 21 DR 138 
233 Campbell and Fell v UK, Commission’s Report of 12 May 1982, A 80; Campbell v UK, Judgment of 27 
September 1999. 
234Rasmussen v Denmark, Judgment of 28 November 1984, A 87 
235 Castells v Spain, Judgment of 23 April 1992, A 236 
236 Piermont v France, Judgment of 27 April 1995, A 314 
237 Incal v Turkey, Judgment of 9 June 1998; Ahmet and Sadik v. Greece, Commission’s Report of 4 April 1995. 
238 The Socialist Party and Others v Turkey, Judgment of 25 May 1998 
239 Though the usage of less-restrictive measures on cases on homosexuality (Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK, 
Judgment of 27 September 1999; Smith and Grady v UK, Judgment of 27 September 1999) and transexuality 
(Sheffield and Horsham v UK, Commission’s Report of 21 January 1997) are entwined with evolutive principles, 
discussed below, and the Court appears to use the less restrictive approach in order to avoid a more sweeping ruling. 
240 Mellacher and Others v Austria, Judgment of 19 December 1989, A 169; Tre Traktörer AB v Sweden, Judgment 
of 7 July 1989, A 159; Hentrich v France, Commission’s Report of 4 May 1993, A 296-A 
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better policies, the Court expressed that it still relates itself to states through the margin of 
appreciation but it perceives it can get away with more.  
By using the margin of appreciation the Court concedes that the Court is subordinate to 
the states’ authorities. This approach, however, gradually limits the margin of appreciations’ 
subordinate connotations by co-opting the symbol. By repudiating governments without claiming 
an ECHR violation the court recontextualizes the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
Recontextualizing the symbol necessarily implies that the Court accepts the margin of 
appreciation’s structure but wants to change certain connotations. The Courts’ usage of this 
method attempts to down-play the assumption that governments are always well-meaning in 
exchange for the idea that governments are well-meaning but sometimes inept. 
Secondly, the Courts usage of the less-restrictive approach shows the Court’s ambition. 
The attempt to change the margin of appreciation through a conciliatory approach accepts the 
limitations of its environment— namely that its authority stems from its member states— but 
tries to expand its powers. By offering a less-restrictive alternative, the Court fundamentally 
implies that it can legislate better than member state legislatures. This implication requires a 
judge to believe that the Court and he/she are able to perceive societies’ normative values and 
apply them. This belief requires a judge to have ambition for him/herself and for the Court as a 
whole.  
Multiple judges’ usage of the less-restrictive approach to the margin of appreciation 





3. What happens in other states? The “comparative-evolutive” method241 
The Court uses the “comparative-evolutive” method to compare and contrast member 
state practices. It then discerns whether common European mores or procedural standards have 
evolved. Judges apply these two tests in tandem, fearing that to do otherwise might compromise 
the autonomy of the Convention.242 By employing an evolutionary test, the court relates 
developments in member states to the Convention. This action relies on the Conventions’ 
vaguely constituted provisions to justify dynamically interpreting its provisions in relation to 
member state law.  
  The Court utilized the “comparative-evolutive” method first in the late-seventies. Since 
then it typically applies the method to cases of marginalized classes and usually finds a reason to 
expand individual’s rights.243 This method has consistently used the margin of appreciation 
doctrine to positively identify European mores and then incorporate them into the ECHR by 
targeting states that drag their heels. This method operates on the premise that the Court keeps 
states up to date on common interpretations of individual rights. Judges, in applying this method, 
express a belief that while the ECtHR may well be the defender of the lowest common 
denominator of European rights, common rights are themselves expanding. It institutionalizes 
                                                 
241 Although ‘evolutive’ is not a real word, the Court applies it to its evolutionary test in the Winterwerp case and 
has stuck with it ever since. See,  Winterwerp v the Netherlands, Judgment of 24 October 1979, A 33; 
242 Matscher, Franz, Ronald St. J. Macdonald, and Herbert Petzold, eds. The European System for the Protection of 
Human Rights(Boston, Massachusetts: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), at 70-73 
243 It applied the method to cases involving: the equal of treatment for officers and servicemen in certain areas, the 
equal treatment of persons of unsound mind, the differential treatment of illegitimate children, the private rights of 
homosexuals, the protection of journalistic sources, the severity of a loyalty system, government-run media 
monopolies, public access to information, restrictions on political parties, the gender makeup of fire brigades and 
public jobs, and hereditary laws. 
See: Winterwerp v the Netherlands, Judgment of 24 October 1979, A 33; Marckx v Belgium Judgment of 13 June 
1979,  Dugeon v UK, Judgment of 22 October 1981, A 45; Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK, Judgment of 27 
September 1999; Smith and Grady v UK, Judgment of 27 September 1999; Goodwin v UK, Judgment of 27 March 
1996; Glasenapp v Germany, Commission’s Report of 11 May 1984, A 104; Informationsverein Lentia and Others 
v Austria, Judgment of 24 November 1993, A 276; Guerra and Others v Italy, Commission’s Report of 19 February 
1998; Sigurdur Sigurjónsson v Iceland, Judgment of 30 June 1993, A 264; United Communist Party of Turkey and 
Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 30 January 1998; Karlheinz Schmidt v Germany, Commission’s Report of 14 January 
1993, A 291-B; Inze v Austria, Judgment of 28 October 1987, A 126 
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the Court as complementary to member states by reacting to rather than enacting evolving 
practice.  
 
4. Do we really want to open this door? The rhetorical approach 
 
The Court also applies the rhetorical usage approach to the margin of appreciation 
doctrine. In politically sensitive cases, the Court can reference the principle of margin of 
appreciation, apply a high standard to disprove proportionality, and never actually conduct an 
identifiable test.244 Judges might rely on a rational study of the facts to determine strict 
proportionality.245 Judges might also just reference the doctrine, implicitly use strict 
proportionality, and dismiss the individual claim.246 The court has been accused of softening an 
adverse finding’s impact by using the margin of appreciation as a “window-dressing” in 
secondary or tertiary claims.247 
 
C. Conclusions: the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
 
The Court uses the margin of appreciation to gradually transfer jurisdictional authority 
over human rights issues from states to the Strasbourg Court. The Court uses the four methods of 
applying the proportionality test to meekly challenge the state governments, co-opt state 
authority, defer to the majority of state law, or mitigate adverse findings.  
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 The margin of appreciation doctrine is therefore still used to balance two ostensibly 
legitimate interests: the states’ interest to protect their national society, and the individual’s 
interest to maintain their rights. The Court assumes in these cases that the actors act in good 
faith, but have opposing interests. However, this identification appears to be changing, as the 
Court begins to portray actors as well-meaning but inept.  
These changing perceptions require that judges firstly believe that the Court acts 
complementary to national jurisdictions. Secondly, the Court’s judges must perceive that the 
Court has an agency with which it can coerce member states’ to protect more than the lowest 
common European values.  
But, by expressing these changing beliefs in the context of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, the Courts’ judges bind the Courts’ agency within the constraints of its treaty structure. 
Judges aspire to make the Court more supranational but operate using intergovernmental 
language. Therefore, the ECtHR’s has used the margin of appreciation to cautiously and 






i.  What it is and what it does: comparing the ECtHR’s constitutive and functional 
teli 
 
Delegates approaching the Council of Europe to create a European Convention of Human 
Right, leaders of state governments who signed the Treaty of Rome on 4 November 1950, 
judges, administrators, advocates, and the individuals who applied to the Court all were parts of 
the creation and development of the Court today. They collectively defined and refined the 
Court’s social telos as they perceived, internalized, and acted on their external environment. 
 
Actors approached the Council of Europe with various changeable conceptions about 
human rights, international courts, one another, and about the social realities of Europe and the 
world in general. Using symbols of UN processes, axes of protectable rights, and concepts of 
courts to argue about the normative values of and in a human rights convention these actors also 
argued over the normative value of their conceptions of reality. These deliberations focused on 
areas of conflict and resulted in an impasse, until an external action exposed areas of consensus 
that the delegates had taken for granted. Once the UN had galvanized regional opinion to 
develop a vague set of common rights that could be immediately institutionalized, the Council of 
Europe, its member states, and the individuals produced new symbols.  
The Strasbourg system was then populated by judges, advocates, and individual 
European citizens, who in turn brought other variable conceptions of reality. Individuals 
increasingly used the Court system to challenge the actions of their governments, and the Court’s 
judges and lawyers had ample opportunity to interact with governmental representatives. These 
actors used the symbol of the margin of appreciation doctrine to communicate ideas about the 
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institution, its components, and reality. In the process, these individuals defined and refined both 
the symbol and the institution. 
These feedback loops of actors perceiving, analyzing, interacting, and reacting and doing 
it all over again were structured by common assumptions about the Court. This chapter identifies 
some of these assumptions. First, actors on the whole assumed that a regional identity could 
functionally co-exist with a global identity, and that the two were inherently different. Second, 
the actors assumed that by co-opting a symbol and redefining it gradually an institution increase 
its agency within its preexisting constraints.  
The European Court of Human Rights was founded as an intergovernmental court with 
an effective complementary jurisdiction over the member states of the Council of Europe. Today, 
the Court cautiously pushes against its member state’s constraints as a complementary 
jurisdiction, but remains intergovernmental. 
 
This Chapter has shown the gradual development of the ECtHR’s identity from its 
constitution through its functioning to today. By examining the usage of the UN/CoE 
relationship, the axes of protectable rights, and the enforcement method in normative arguments 
this Chapter illustrated that external actors defined the ECtHR as a complementary jurisdiction to 
national courts.  By examining the development of the margin of appreciation doctrine and the 
proportionality tests this chapter showed that the Court internally identifies itself as a 
complementary jurisdiction but wants more authority. Chapter III examines the identity of the 
ECJ by analyzing its historical functioning and internal identity compared to its externally 
constituted identity and recent jurisdictional expansion. Chapter IV concludes this paper by 
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relating this chapter on the ECtHR to chapter III on the ECJ and developing a prediction for the 














The European Court of Justice is the supranational judiciary of the European Union. The 
Court has operated since 1952, when it functioned as the judiciary of the European Coal and 
Steel Community. Its competences are limited by the European Union’s treaties. Under the 
treaties’ authorities, the ECJ functions as a regional organ both internally and externally. The 
Court adjudicates all matters of community law— whether related to the treaties, the secondary 
legislation of the community’s organs, or the general principles that emanate from them.248 
After the Lisbon treaty passed in December 2009,249 the Court’s competences have 
expanded into the protection of individual rights through the ratification of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.250 The Court has grown into a new area through member state mandate. 
This area converges on the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. Member states have therefore given the 
                                                 
248 That is, regulations, directives, decisions or opinions, see Chapter I, p. 22  
249 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
can be found in the Official Journal of the European Union (2007/C 306/01), online at the Commission’s website 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1296&lang=en  
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Court a new constitutive telos, after the Court had already developed a functional telos. This 
constitutive telos is problematic because the two regional courts dually have jurisdiction over the 
EU member states. 
This chapter examines the jurisprudence of the ECJ and the foundation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms to understand how the ECJ relates to individuals and states. 
By beginning with an analysis of the Court’s case law prior to the Charter’s 2009 constitution, 
this chapter first establishes what the Court does with its given jurisdiction.  Second, this Chapter 
examines the history of the Charter’s founding to establish what the court’s individual rights 
jurisdiction is today.  
The chapter concludes that the ECJ is supranational organ that tends to quickly expand its 
authority into member state jurisdictions when given a narrow area of competence. The Charter 
widens these competences significantly. The Court therefore has divergent endogenous and 
exogenous purposes.  
 
i. What it does: the Court’s functional telos251 
 
The Court’s constitutive telos, its exogenous purpose, has just entered into law. Actors 
inside the Court have not had time to internally define its purpose under the new human rights 
laws. Therefore, to establish how the Court internally processes identity, this section examines 
how the European Court of Justice’s judges, advocates, and European individuals constructed the 
role of the ECJ in the European region in its pre-2009 jurisprudence. This jurisprudence has 
                                                 
251 Cases referenced from 1998 onward can be found online at either http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-
bin/form.pl?lang=en or http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm. Case law before 1998 can be found in the European 
navigator at http://www.ena.lu. Most cases were pointed out by Kaczorowska, Alina. European Union Law. 
(London, UK: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 
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historically focused on international economic and corporate law as these areas comprised its 
competences. International economic and corporate law deals with issues like import duties, 
chemical labeling practices, and corporation’s legal rights, for example.  
This section therefore examines what the court did with its corporate law jurisdiction to 
determine how the Court used symbols to historically express its internal identification of its 
relationship to member states and individuals. The symbols this section examines are the direct 
effect and supremacy doctrines.  
This section is divided into three subsections. The first subsection identifies relevant 
actors who interact under the Court’s institutional structures and introduces the direct effect and 
supremacy doctrines as symbols. The second subsection examines the development of the direct 
effect and supremacy doctrines to distinguish how these symbols were identified, defined, and 
applied. The third and final subsection concludes by relating the direct effect and supremacy 
doctrine to reconstruct the ECJ’s role in the European region. It finds that the ECJ, given a 
narrow band of law, wields the direct effect and supremacy doctrines to categorically refuse to 
defer to national courts and actively subsume member state law. 
 
A. The context of the Court 
 
Individuals, states, corporations, and the Union organs can apply to and face trial in its 
jurisdiction. Its judges are appointed by the member states, but internally organize into chambers 
of 3, 5, or 13. Since the Court operates collegiately and all opinions come from the Court as a 
whole, minority opinions are not procedurally possible. The European Commission enforces the 
Court’s judgments and penalizes states for failing to adhere to the ECJ’s decisions. If a member 
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state refuses to adhere to the Court’s decisions, the Commission can initiate the EU’s expulsion 
procedures against that state.252  
 The symbols that the ECJ uses to express its jurisdiction’s relationship to national courts 
are the direct effect and supremacy doctrines.253 The direct effect doctrine is the Court’s 
requirement that national courts procedurally apply community law whenever they can. The 
supremacy doctrine justifies this procedural requirement by substantively subordinating national 
law to community law. European actors have constructed these doctrines to define the Court as a 
supranational court that expands quickly into whatever jurisdiction the EU’s treaty law provides 
it. 
 
B. The Court’s jurisprudence 
 
The Court’s jurisprudence began in 1952, and the Court operates today. Though 
applications from individuals have increased since the early 1990’s, the difference between pre-
Berlin application rates and post-Berlin application rates are not as significant as in the ECtHR. 
Most individual applications to the EU have related to corporate and trade issues, since the 
Court’s competences were limited to these areas prior to the Lisbon Treaty.  
This section examines the Court’s economic jurisprudence to show how the Court has 
developed the direct effect and supremacy doctrines. This development in turn shows how the 
Court has historically internally defined its jurisdictional role in Europe.  
The Court used the direct effect principle as a procedural tool to coerce states into 
applying a monist framework of regional legal structures within its national courts. The Court 
                                                 
252 This has never happened. 
253 The supremacy doctrine is also called the primacy doctrine. 
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developed the supremacy doctrine as a substantive tool to convince states into accepting a monist 
framework. These tools, therefore are related in their ends, but differ in their means. 
As in the ECtHR, the Court developed its doctrines through a three-stage process: 
identification, definition, and application. First, the doctrine was named and recognized. Second, 
the doctrine was defined. Third, the doctrine was applied. During application, the conflicts 
between the Court’s changing internal identities and interests and the doctrine’s stationary 
definition were corrected as necessary. This subsection studies the direct effect doctrine and the 
supremacy doctrine, in turn, through these developmental stages. 
 
i. The direct effect of community law 
 
The ECJ created the direct effect doctrine as a procedural tool to apply community law 
within national courts’ jurisdictions. The direct effect principle is the doctrine that requires 
national courts to apply community law within their jurisdictions when applicable community 
law exists. The Court identified the principle broadly and has since limited the doctrine’s scope.  
 
When wielding the direct effect doctrine, the Court communicates ideas about the role of 
the community law’s jurisdictional processes to itself and to others. Historically, the Court used 
the direct effect doctrine to promote the existence of a monist legal framework in the European 




This subsection traces the Court’s development of the direct effect from its identification 
and definition in Van Gend en Loos to its common usage today.254 This subsection identifies the 
direct effect doctrine as a procedural symbol the Court invokes to communicate its role as a 
monist legal authority within the regional legal structure by co-opting national courts. It also 




 In Van Gend en Loos, the European Court of Justice held that community law conferred 
obligations and rights onto individuals which national courts must protect even if the court must 
contradict national law.  
Van Gend en Loos involved a chemical company that had imported urea-formaldehyde 
into the Netherlands from Germany after the Netherlands enacted new Benelux tariff legislation. 
The new legislation reclassified the chemical into a higher duty range, and the Netherlands 
charged van Gend the higher duty. The company challenged the increase as a violation of Article 
12 (Discrimination on the basis of nationality) of the Treaty on the European Community 
(“TEC”). Van Gend had first appealed the process within Dutch courts, but to no avail. The 
Court ruled in favor of the van Gend en Loos Corporation and identified the direct effect 
principle as a sine qua non for the community to effectively enforce its treaty-law.  
In Van Gend en Loos the Court used a rhetoric to describe the direct effect doctrine that 
presupposed its necessity. The doctrine was a sine qua non for community functioning. For the 
doctrine to be a prerequisite of the Community, the Court had to perceive its role in the region as 
at the head of a monist hierarchy.  
                                                 
254 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 3 
94 
 
This rhetoric dictated to other actors the doctrine’s functional language— namely, the 




The direct effect concept was first broadly enunciated by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the case Concerning Competences of the Courts of Danzig (3 February 
1928, Series B, No. 15).255 The PCIJ conferred obligations and rights on individuals in regard to 
treaties whose intentions were explicitly to do so.  However, the European Court of Justice 
ignored the PCIJ’s intent requirement in Van Gend en Loos. The Court ruled broadly that the 
direct effect applies to all forms of community law, whether they explicitly or implicitly confer 
obligations and rights.256 
Van Gend en Loos therefore explicitly defined the direct effect principle as a blanket 
requirement for national courts.257 To argue that the doctrine had no real limitations, the Court 
necessarily presupposed that the Union had full control over the development and 
implementation of its law. In this view, any national law that externally undermines the region’s 
monist structure has to be invalidated. The Court’s broad definition therefore reflected its belief 
that the community was at the top of the region’s jurisdictional food chain in its competence 
areas by asserting its unlimited direct effect onto the national courts. 
                                                 
255 Found in Spiermann, Ole. Intenational Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp 270-273.  
256 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 3 at Section B 
257 Ibid. at Section B 
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In its definitional stages, which also occurred in the Van Gend en Loos case, the Court 
constructed the direct effect principle as an unlimited symbol of the Court’s final authority 




 In subsequent cases,258 the Court refined the definition of the direct effect principle and 
limited its meaning. It first supplied necessary conditions for a community law to be directly 
effective. It then identified how a national court can legitimately apply the direct effect principle 
through dual axes analysis of the actors and laws involved in the dispute. The Court therefore 
limited the direct effect doctrine’s meaning by narrowing who and what can apply it.  The Court 
narrowed what community law can apply direct effect by supplying necessary conditions to the 
direct effect doctrine. The Court narrowed who can claim and rely on the direct effect by 
delineating claims along two axes. The following subsections describe these refinements in turn. 
 
a.  Direct effect’s necessary conditions 
 
Direct effect is necessarily a binary test (i.e. it applies or it doesn’t). Therefore, to 
determine when direct effect applies to a community provision, the Court applied three necessary 
conditions. First, a provision of community law must be sufficiently clear. Second, the provision 
must be precise.  And third, the provision must be unconditional. In order for a community law’s 
provision to be directly effective in national courts, it must satisfy all three conditions.  
                                                 
258 Case 148/78 Ratti [1979] ECR 1629; Case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53; C-236/92 Comitato di Coordinamento 
per la Difesa della Cava v Regione Lombardia [1994] ECR I-483 
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The Court defined the term “unconditional provisions” in the late 1960’s. A provision of 
law is unconditional if it can be applied without further action at the national or community 
level.259 In the early 1980’s the Court established that conditional statements attached to a 
provision by community organs may delay its direct effect in national jurisdictions, but a 
conditional statement made by a member state based on procedural grounds cannot delay or 
nullify a law’s direct effect.260  
The Court defined “clear” and “precise” in 1981 to mean that the law must be rationally 
understandable to a citizen with adequate access to a community or national judge’s 
interpretation.261 This refinement implicitly glossed the ECtHR’s Sunday Times decision from 
1979 into community law.262  
By paralleling the ECtHR’s rulings in its case law, the Court did two things. First, it 
limited the blanket requirement of Van Gend en Loos. Second, it connected its jurisdictional 
processes fundamentally to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.  
Therefore by applying necessary conditions to the direct effect in the early 1980’s the 
Court communicated two ideas about its changing role. First, it maintained that a monist 
hierarchy existed in its areas of competence. Second, the Court expressed its self-recognition as 
an institution embedded in a regional jurisdictional structure.  
 
                                                 
259 Case 27/67 Fink Frucht [1968] ECR 223; and broadly in Case 57/65 Lütticke [1966] ECR 205, where Member 
States have no discretionary powers in relation to Article 90(3) of the TEC; 
260 Case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53 
261 Case 203/80 Casati [1981] ECR 2595 




b. Applicability standards 
 The Court provided national courts applicability standards to apply the direct effect 
doctrine in the 1990’s in Marleasing.263 It defined the direct effect principle as operating along 
two axes. The Court labeled cases where an individual relies on community law against a 
governmental organ of the EU or a member state as the vertical application of direct effect.  The 
Court labeled cases where an individual relies on community law against another individual as 
the horizontal application of direct effect. Provisions that apply vertically do not necessarily 
apply horizontally. However provisions that apply horizontally also apply vertically.264  
In Marleasing, an individual applicant relied on an EC directive265 against a corporation. 
The applicant alleged that the corporation was created as a front to defraud its creditors, i.e.     
the applicant. The Court ruled that directives could not on their own apply to claims between 
individuals because directives are primarily intended to constrain state action. Thus the Court 
created the distinction between vertical and horizontal direct effect when it deferred an 
individual-individual case to national jurisdictions.266  
The Court ruled that national courts were obliged to interpret national law “so far as was 
possible”267 to account for the directive in cases between individuals. The Marleasing decision 
                                                 
263 Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135 
264 See: Case 6/64 Costa [1964] ECR 585; Case 77/72 Capolongo [1973] ECR 611; Case 120/73 Lorenz [1973]; 
Case 251/78 Denkavit [1979] ECR 3369. 
265 A legislative act that directs and binds specific states’ toward accomplishing a specific end. Directives don’t 
usually provide a means to the end and allow states to choose its implementation process. (Article 243 of the TEC). 
Compare this to regulations, which immediately apply to all EU member states. See Chapter I. p24 
266 The flip side of the coin is that provisions that affect individual behavior must also affect state behavior, and 




has since been interpreted to mean that horizontal applications of direct effect rarely emanate 
from secondary law.268 
The Court had implicitly refined the vertical application of the direct effect in the 1980’s, 
but applied these refinements to the doctrine in the early 2000’s. In the 1980’s, individuals relied 
on directives269 against governmental bodies in national courts on the basis of their direct effect. 
The Court provided national courts three tools to identify when and how to vertically apply a 
directive through the direct effect doctrine. These tools are all wielding direct effect’s vertical 
application against member state’s government. 
First, where a government incorrectly implements a directive national courts must apply 
the directive’s provisions instead of the national provisions.270  Second, where a government fails 
to implement a directive in the given time frame, the government can’t rely on directive 
provisions against an individual.271 Third, governments can’t rely on a directive alone against an 
individual in criminal proceedings.272  
In providing applicability standards to the direct effect doctrine, the Court defined its role 
in relation to the European region. The Court was not a court where individuals could rely on 
community law against other individuals. The Court was a court where individuals could rely on 
community law against governments in almost every case. Thus, the Court communicated from 
the late 1980’s to the early 2000’s its belief that its role in Europe was to adjudicate conflicts 
between individuals and their governments. However, while doing so the Court maintained its 
                                                 
268 Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori [1994] ECR I-3325; See also, generally, Kaczorowska pp 305-306. 
269 See Chapter I p 18 
270 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 1891, Case 31/87 Beentjes [1988] ECR 4635, Cases C-397 to 
C-403/01 Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I-8835. 
271 Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969, Cases C-397 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I-8835. 
272 Case C-271/91 Marshall [1993] ECR I-4367, Case C-319-93 Vaneetveld [1994] ECR I-763, Case C-91/92 
Faccini Dori [1994] ECR I-3325. 
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role at the head of a monist legal hierarchy, and wielded the direct effect doctrine against 
member state authority. 
The Court, therefore, in the 1990’s and 2000’s began to identify itself as a supranational 
court at the head of a narrowly defined monist hierarchy that is embedded within the European 
regional legal structures and constrains state behavior. 
 
IV. Conclusions: the direct effect doctrine 
 
The Court identified the direct effect doctrine strongly but then limited its application. 
When invoking the direct effect principle, the Court co-opts a national court’s jurisdiction to 
apply community provisions. Usually, the application of direct effect is detrimental to state 
governments. The ECJ has deferred a margin of interpretative authority to national courts by 
allowing national courts to determine when and how to apply direct effect to community 
provisions. However, the Court maintains its ability to interpret the direct effect principle itself 
and thus maintains final authority to wield the doctrine.  
   
The Court uses the direct effect principle as a procedural tool to communicate ideas about 
its role to member state governments. While adjudicating cases of individuals’ conflicts with a 
member state, the Court has communicated three ideas. First, the Court embedded itself within 
the European legal structures by applying the ECtHR’s tests to its own doctrines. Second, the 
Court constructed itself as primarily affecting the relationship of the individual to a state. Third, 
the Court has maintained its position at the head of a monist legal hierarchy. 
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In the process of constructing a procedural symbol to apply a narrow regional legal 
monism, the Court necessarily assumed that the substance of community law also existed above 
the substance of national law. Otherwise, the Court could not have justified the sine-qua-non 
principle that justified the doctrine in the first place. In order for community law to be directly 
effective to assure the community’s effectiveness, the Court had to believe that community law 
had to be effective over national law. This assumption was codified and refined under the 
supremacy doctrine. 
 
ii. The supremacy of community law 
 
The ECJ created the supremacy doctrine as a substantive tool to justify the direct effect of 
community law in national courts’ jurisdictions. The supremacy doctrine elevates the substance 
of all community law above the substance of all national law. The Court identified the principle 
broadly and has maintained its breadth in all but the most marginal areas of community law.  
The Court, in developing the supremacy doctrine, has communicated ideas about the role 
of community law’s substance in the European region to itself and to others. When wielding the 
principle, the Court promoted the existence of a regional legal monist framework in its area of 
competence.273  
 
                                                 
273 See generally, Case 6/64 Falminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585, 593; Case C-143/88 and C-92/89 
Zuckerfabrik Südreithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe and Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v Hauptzollamt; 
Paderborn [1991] ECR I-415; Case 14/68 Walt Willhelm [1969] ECR 1; and  Atkin, James and Baron Atkin, in M. 
Akehurst. Modern Introduction to International Law. (London: Harper Collins, 2007) p. 45 
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This subsection traces the Court’s development of the supremacy doctrine from its 
identification in Costa v. ENEL to its common usage today.274 The subsection identifies the 
supremacy principle as a substantive symbol that the Court invokes to communicate its role as 
the overarching Court of a uniformly monist legal system in a narrow area of law. 
 
I. Identification 
 The Court’s first used the supremacy doctrine in 1964 in Falminio Costa v. ENEL 
(“Costa”). The Court explicitly identified the direct effect’s assumption of a legal hierarchy 
within the doctrine.  
In Costa, a shareholder of a privately owned electricity provider refused to pay his ENEL 
electricity bill. He argued that the Italian nationalization of its electricity system in 1960, which 
subsumed his share of the private company, was illegal under community law. The Italian 
Giudice Conciliatore asked for a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice about 
whether community law could confer actionable rights and obligations on the individual. The 
Court ruled that Article 177 of the TEC275 granted all of community law supremacy over national 
law wherever community law has direct effect. The Court ruled in favor of the Italian 
government, however, because it found that the EEC provision the applicant relied on was not 
directly effective, and therefore not supreme.  
The Court ruled that in order for community law to maintain an effective legal basis, the 
substance of community law cannot be overridden by any member state law.276 From this 
perspective, member states subsumed their sovereign legislating powers to the community’s 
body of law in order that the community’s laws could have effect. 
                                                 
274 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 3 
275 Treaty Establishing the European Communities. 1957 see Chapter I, p 18 




The Court initially identified the supremacy doctrine as applying to any community 
provision that was directly effective in national courts. This did two things. First, it linked the 
supremacy doctrine to the direct effect doctrine by expressing implicit assumptions made and the 
rhetoric used in Van Gend en Loos. It identified the supremacy doctrine as a different side of the 
same monist coin with the direct effect doctrine. Second, the Court reaffirmed that community 
law was above national law, by identifying community as substantively greater than national law 
wherever it exists. Through these two facts the Court communicated that it is an overarching 




As shown above, the definition of the supremacy doctrine occurred generally in Van 
Gend en Loos. Van Gend en Loos established the supremacy of the community’s primary law by 
requiring national courts to procedurally apply community law in its decisions, but did not label 
the principle’s application to the substance of either law. Costa labeled Van Gend en Loos’ 
substantive presupposition, and adopted its assertion of a monist legal structure through 
arguments of necessary conditions. 
The supremacy doctrine was therefore also defined by a blanket requirement that 
without which the Union’s authority would be ineffective. This rhetoric would be reaffirmed 






Between 1969 and today, the Court applied and refined the meaning of the supremacy 
doctrine. In its application, the Court delimited what community laws and what national laws the 
supremacy principle super- or subordinates.  
This subsection is broken into two parts. The first part examines what community laws 
the Court empowers with the supremacy principle. The second part explores what national laws 
the Court subjects to the supremacy principle.  
 
a. Community law with supremacy277 
 
In 1969, following Costa, the Court reaffirmed the supremacy principle’s blanket 
application to primary law in the Willhelm decision.278 It reaffirmed Willhelm in 1989 in the 
Zuckerfabrik cases.279  Today, all of the Union’s primary law can subsume national law by 
applying the supremacy doctrine.  
In Willhelm, the Court utilized the sine qua non premise of Costa to open the door for the 
Court to define the supremacy doctrine’s application to secondary legislation. Willhelm’s 
language focused on the divide between laws with direct effect and laws without direct effect 
rather than between primary and secondary law.  
The Court applied the supremacy principle to secondary legislation in 1972 in 
Marimex,280 and then again a year later in Politi.281 In these cases, the Court ruled that 
                                                 
277 Community law is separated into primary law (the treaties), secondary law (regulations, directives, decisions and 
opinions), and general principles that emanate from them. See Chapter I. p 22 for their distinguishing features. 
278 Case 14/68 Walt Willhelm [1969] ECR 1 
279 Case C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Südreithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe and Zuckerfabrik Soest 
GmbH v Hauptzollamt [1989]; 
280 Case 84/71 Marimex v. Italian Ministry of Finance [1972] ECR 89 
281 Case 43/71 Politi s.a.s v. Ministry for Finance of the Italian Republic [1971] ECR 1039 
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community regulations must also have the force of supreme law so that the community’s 
legislative organs can be effective.282 The Court then applied this supremacy to certain decisions 
made by the European Commission in 1979 in the Salumfico case.283 These cases all dealt with 
the supremacy of regulations. 
In 1975 the Court applied the supremacy doctrine to the international agreements made 
by the Union’s organs through secondary law.284 Since then, international agreements made by 
the Union have maintained an unlimited supremacy over similar agreements made by states. 
In 1981, the Court limited the scope of directives that can apply the supremacy 
doctrine.285 In Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft the Court applied the direct effect’s ECtHR-glossed 
“unconditional and sufficiently precise” test to determine if a directive can apply the supremacy 
doctrine.286 This limitation is marginal, however, and the Court retains its sole ability to change 
how courts interpret directives.287 In the 1980’s and 1990’s the Court further limited the 
supremacy doctrine’s application to directives that implicitly claim direct effect.288 In the early 
1990’s the Court limited state liability under supreme directives.289 
                                                 
282 Politi, at para 9. 
283 Decisions must be based on implementing directly effective regulations. See: Case 130/78 Salumificio di 
Cornuad SpA v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1979] ECR 867 
284 Case 38/75 Douaneagent der NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen v Inspecteur der invoerrechten en accijnzen [1975] 
ECR 1439 at para 13 
285 Cases arising from directives generally only come out of instances where a state does not comply with a directive 
and attempts to rely on national law that conflict with its directive obligations against an individual. The directives at 
issue therefore require vertical direct effect. Nearly all the following  cases are about labor, labeling, taxes, or safety 
code practices: Case 158/80 Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH et Rewe-Markt Steffen v Hauptzollamt Kiel 
[1981] ECR 1805; Case 8/81 Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53 
286  Again, the Court allowed national courts to apply tests to determine whether a secondary provision is precise and 
unconditional enough to require supremacy over national laws. See Chapter III p. 95-96, Chapter I, p. 22 
287 Case 158/80 Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH et Rewe-Markt Steffen v Hauptzollamt Kiel [1981] ECR 1805; 
Case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, para 1  
288  Case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, para 1; 
Case C-6/90 and 9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and other v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357 para 
9. Case C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Federal Republic of Germany and The Queen (of the 
United Kingdom) v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd, and Others [1996] ECR I-1029 at 
para 4 
289 Case C-287/98 Grand Duchy of Luxemburg v Berthe Linster, Aloyse Linster and Yvone Linster [2000] ECR I-
6917 at para 30; Case 34/67 Firma Gebrüder Lück v Hauptzollamt Köln [1968] ECR 245; Case 106/77 
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The Court in Wachauf applied the supremacy doctrine to the treaties’ general intent and 
purposes.290 National governments may not rely on any national or community law that may in 
any way oppose rights intended by the treaties.291 The Court has generally avoided establishing 
this area further due to its inherent vagary. 
 
 The Court has applied the supremacy doctrine to almost all forms of community law. The 
only areas that the Court hasn’t fully applied the doctrine are to community provisions that are 
vague or have ambiguous intent. In its application to community law, the Court has reaffirmed 
the presupposition that community law without the supremacy law cannot feasibly function. 
Through this application, therefore, the Court communicates its belief that community law’s 
substance exists above national law’s substance in a monist legal framework. 
 
b. Member state law subject to supremacy 
 
Unless a community law specifically states it is not supreme, the Court has found that any 
and all forms of pre-existing national law are subject to the supremacy doctrine. The Court has 
allowed little leeway in this matter. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629 (“Simmenthal II”); Case 103/88 
Fratelli Coxtanzo SpA v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1861; Case C-46/93 and C-48/93Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v 
Federal Republic of Germany and The Queen (of the United Kingdom) v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame Ltd, and Others [1996] ECR I-1029; Case C-10/97 to C-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE.’90 
Srl, and others [1998] ECR I-6307 para 27-28; see generally, Kaczorowska pp 324-6 
290 Case 5/88 Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährun und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 
291 Ibid. at para 2. 
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 In 1968 the Court determined that any member state law or action is subject to supremacy 
principle. In Firma Gebrüder Lück v Hauptzollamt Köln,292 the German state argued that 
community law was meant to protect the functioning of national constitutional laws, and thus 
ought to yield to certain fundamental, structural principles of national Constitutions.293 However, 
the Court concluded that the potential future damage to the protection of all Europeans’ 
fundamental rights outweighs any actual damage to a handful of German importer/exporters’ 
“freedom of action and disposition” under German constitutional law.294 The Court ruled against 
the German state, and subjected any national law to the supremacy doctrine.  
Since 1968, the Court has only expanded the obligations that the supremacy doctrine 
imposes on states. 
 In 1974, the Court determined in Commission v. French Republic that if the community 
passes a law, any pre-existing national laws must change to reflect it. 295  If a government does 
not change a law which parallels the community law, it can’t legally apply the national law. The 
obligation to update national law to reflect community law applies even after the Court 
determines a community law procedurally inapplicable.296 At the turn of the millennium, the 
Court reaffirmed Commission v. French Republic’s ‘obligation-to-update.’  
In 2000, the Court applied the supremacy doctrine to some national laws which are 
consistent with community law in substance but inconsistent in procedure. For example: the 
legitimate expropriation of land by a national legislative process that did not include a required 
                                                 
292 Case 34/67 Firma Gebrüder Lück v Hauptzollamt Köln [1968] ECR 245; Reaffirmed in Case 106/77 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629 (“Simmenthal II”); 
293 ibid. para 2 
294 Ibid. para 2, 3, 18, 20.  
295 Case 167/73 Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic [1974] Para 40 
296 Ibid. para 41-42 
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‘consent procedure’ was subject to the supremacy doctrine’s application.297 Since only 
community law with direct effect can affect a national legislative process, national courts have a 
little interpretive leeway in this matter.298  
In the recent past, the Court slightly limited the extent of national judicial rulings that 
yield to community rulings. In 2006, in Kapferer, the Court ruled that a case with res judicata299 
on the national level cannot be retried at the behest any community law.300 The Court justifies 
this limitation fairly simply: res judicata is an important concept to the functioning of both the 
community and national jurisdiction and therefore must be respected by both.  
  
The Court doesn’t care where national law comes from. When the Court applied the 
supremacy doctrine to the German human rights code, it explicitly stated that all national law is 
subordinate to directly effective community law. In not limiting the doctrine’s application, the 
Court affirmed and institutionalized the supremacy doctrine’s meaning as a substantive 
promotion of the community’s legal authority. 
 
IV. Conclusions: the supremacy doctrine 
 
 The Court has reaffirmed and institutionalized its initial definition of the supremacy 
doctrine. The Court initially defined the doctrine to mean the substantive subordination of 
national law to community law. The community is allowed to wield the doctrine while the states 
                                                 
297 See Case C-287/98 Grand Duchy of Luxemburg v Berthe Linster, Aloyse Linster and Yvone Linster [2000] ECR 
I-6917  
298 Though the Court in Berthe made overtures toward nullifying this distinction and applying supremacy to all 
national procedural law. See: ibid. at para 32 
299 “A thing completed” meaning the case has been dismissed, decided, or closed in national jurisdictions. 
300 Case C-234/04 Rosmarie Kapferer v Schlank & Schick GmbH [2006] ECR I-2585 para 20-21;via Case C-453/00 
Kühne & Heitz NV v Produktschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren [2004] ECR I-837 para 26 
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cannot. Thus, the Court has asserted final legal authority within the Community’s discretion by 
applying the supremacy doctrine.  
Therefore, the Court has used the supremacy doctrine to fundamentally assert a 
conception of the European legal structure as monist in the areas where the Court has 
competence. 
C. Conclusions: the ECJ’s jurisprudence 
 The Court uses the direct effect and supremacy doctrines to establish itself procedurally 
and substantively above national jurisdictions. By applying the direct effect doctrine, the Court 
co-opts national court’s jurisdictions to apply community law before national law. By applying 
the supremacy doctrine, the Court subverts the efficacy of national law in relation to community 
law. The Court uses these to doctrines to subvert and co-opt national jurisdictions in the areas of 
the Court’s competence. 
 The Court’s usage of these two doctrines reflected its fundamental conception of the 
European legal order, and its role within it. First, the Court perceives that in a narrow band of 
law there exists a monist legal framework at whose head its jurisdiction stands. Second, the 
Court perceives that this narrow band of law is defined by Community, not state, processes. 
Third, in these areas, the Court has actively subordinated national courts to itself. This activity 
implies the courts’ willingness to undermine its member states authority and assert its 
supranational position. Fourth, the Court recognized its role in relation to the ECtHR by applying 
doctrines developed in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence to its own doctrines when it can.  
 Therefore, the Court in its functioning has constructed its purpose in the European region 
as an active supranational court that fundamentally undermines other jurisdictions for its own 
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efficacy. The Court has asserted this self-identification in a narrow area of law, which it 





ii. What it is: the Court’s constitutive telos 
In 1977 the European Council, Commission, and Parliament made a joint declaration that 
stressed the importance of the protection of fundamental rights as stated in the ECHR and in 
Member State Constitutions. This declaration established the protections of fundamental rights as 
valuable objectives for the Community as a whole.301 In 1989 the Parliament, during the 
preparation of the Maastricht Treaty, released a declaration and a resolution that proposed the 
creation of a draft Charter of fundamental rights and Freedoms.302 The proposal languished until 
1999.  
On 3-4 June 1999, The European Council met in Cologne to consider major issues facing 
the Union after the Amsterdam treaty entered into force. During their discussion, the Heads of 
State of the 15 European Union member states decided that, “the fundamental rights applicable 
at Union level should be consolidated in a Charter and thereby made more evident.”303 On 15-16 
October 1999, the European Council met again in Tampere. The Tampere Council clarified the 
composition, process, and logistics of an intergovernmental convention (the “Convention”) 
whose purpose was to draft an EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
The IGC comprised members from the national governments, national parliaments, the 
European Commission, and the European Parliament. Observers attended the deliberations from 
the Court of Justice, the Council of Europe, and the European Court of Human Rights. The 
                                                 
301 European Parliament, Council Commission. Joint Declaration of 05.04.1977 by the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission. OJ C 103 of 27.04.1977, p 1. Accessed from 
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deliberative process was fully transparent; during the deliberations all working documents were 
made public. The Economic and Social Committee of the European Parliament, the Committee 
of the Regions (local representative organ in the European Parliament), the Ombudsman of the 
Union; and social, corporate, and policy non-governmental organizations were invited to 
contribute their opinions.  
 
In 2000, member state representatives, member state parliamentary representatives, and 
Union delegates perceived a need to make individual rights more visible in the expanding 
European Union. They believed that a legal document would accomplish this best.304 These 
perceptions might have been caused by a growing internal interest in presenting a strong identity 
to the rest of the world. Or, these perceptions might have been caused by an internal desire to 
accelerate the expansion of individual rights within the Union. Regardless of how their 
perceptions were motivated, European actors approached the IGC with an internal consensus that 
enacting a new, expanded set of regional individual rights was a worthy undertaking. The 
deliberations of the Convention were not over whether to make a Charter, but what to make the 
Charter into.305  
After its IGC creation, the Charter of Fundamental Rights was packaged with the 
Constitutional Treaty. Member state governments and the European population roundly rejected 
the Constitutional Treaty and the Charter in 2004 referenda. After a three year ‘period of 
reflection’, the Charter was included in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. In December 2009, the 
                                                 
304 Though the EU organs are apparently looking for more ways than just the legalization of rights to promote 
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Lisbon Treaty finally passed an Irish referendum that had yet again threatened to delay the 
Charters’ inclusion and enforcement indefinitely. Now, the Charter is a formal part of the 
European Union’s treaty law and is judicable by the European Court of Justice. The Court’s 
constitutive telos was therefore fundamentally re-defined by individuals, member state delegates, 
Union representatives, and NGO advocates in the IGC of 1999-2000.  
 
This section looks at the available material about the Charter’s creation in the 1999-2000 
Intergovernmental Convention306 to show how actors externally perceived the role of the ECJ in 
the European regional legal structures. It conducts an analysis of the non-state contributions, and 
relates these contributions to the IGC’s justifications of the Charter’s provisions.  
This section is divided into two subsections. The first subsection surveys the preparatory 
work, the composition, and the symbols that were used in the Intergovernmental Convention to 
discuss the Charter’s concepts. The second subsection identifies how non-state actors and the 
Convention generally and finally perceived European individual rights and the regional role of 
the ECJ. 
 This section establishes that more actors perceive themselves to hold agency to redefine 
the ECJ than the ECtHR. While communicating their interests and regional identities, these 
actors recognized an internal consensus by agreeing over the normative definitions of the EU’s 
legal structure, socio-economic rights, and the relationship of regional institutions. Actors agreed 
that the Charter would be judicable by the ECJ. They agreed that socio-economic rights were 
fundamental individual rights. And participants agreed that the region can handle the existence of 
two human rights courts.  
                                                 
306 Which titled itself the “European Convention.” A name which, for clarity’s sake I will avoid due to its similarity 
to the “European Council”, the “European Commission”, etc. which I think are confusing enough as it is. I will use 
the names “the Convention” or “the IGC” to describe the body that created the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
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The IGC therefore expanded the Court’s competences to reflect expanding concepts of 
fundamental rights under the assumption that the ECJ jurisdiction will co-operate with the 
ECtHR. This fundamentally redefines the Court from its functional telos by potentially 
undermining the established monist hierarchy that the Court had developed since Van Gend en 
Loos.  
 
A. Preparatory work 
 
The Tampere European Council meeting instructed the Chairperson of the IGC, Roman 
Herzog, to perform the appropriate preparatory work in association with his Vice-Chairpersons. 
The Vice-chairs were Antonio Vitorino (the Italian European Commission delegate), Iñigo 
Méndez de Vigo (the Spanish European Parliament delegate), and Loukas Apostolidis (the Greek 
national parliamentary delegate). These individuals invited the various actors to submit opinions 
and/or attend the IGC in Brussels. The Convention began its work in December 1999. 
This subsection first outlines the actors who attempted to affect the development of the 
Charter and their relationships. Then, it surveys the source material used for the Charter. The 





The Intergovernmental Convention was attended by 113 individuals who represented the 
European Parliament, the European Commission, national parliaments, and national 
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governments.307 It was observed by 12 individuals from the European Court of Justice, the 
Committee of the Regions, the Economic and Social Committee, the Ombudsman, the Council of 
Europe, and the European Court of Human Rights. Social non-governmental organizations, 
corporations, Unions, legal experts, and many more actors were invited to submit written 
recommendations to the Convention. These opinions were included in each individual delegate’s 
dossier.  
The IGC’s actors generally operated on the regional or domestic level. More often than 
not, delegates had to operate on both levels. Delegates from the Union organs likely had working 
relationships with one another. Although national parliamentary members likely had fewer 
relationships with the other delegates, they likely knew of each other generally. Other than 
residing and working in the European Union, the IGC’s delegates had no common platform that 
connected them. This contrasts the European Movement party that connected almost every 
delegate at the Council of Europe’s deliberations over the ECHR.308  
The leader of the Convention, and its primary spokesperson, was the former German 
Bundespräsident President Roman Herzog.309 Trained as a professor of law, Roman Herzog is a 
German lawyer, parliamentarian, judge, and Christian-Democrat (center-right) politician from 
                                                 
307 European Parliament “Members of the Convention responsible for drafting the Charter of fundamental rights 
(1999-2000)” (Brussels: European Parliament, 2005). Accessed last 24 April 2010 at 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/composition_en.htm. 
308 See Chapter II pp 41-43 
309 “Roman Herzog über seine Arbeit in einer EU-Kommission- ‘Keine Debatte über Verfassung’” Die Welt. 12 
February 2000, p 6. Accessed last 23 April 2010 at 
http://www.ena.lu/interview_roman_herzog_welt_12_february_2000-2-18315.  
 
N.B. The Bundespräsident is the federally elected leader of the Bundestag. S/he is elected to a five-year term by 
delegations from each Land (the German equivalent of the American state), and is the German ceremonial Head of 




Landshut, Germany. He was president of the German republic from 1994-1999.310 He retired 
after leading the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ development Convention. 
 
ii. Source material 
 
The Convention based the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ provisions on the United 
Nations’ UDHR, the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charters, the 
ECtHR and the ECJ’s jurisprudence, and the constitutions of the EU’s member states.311  
Delegates primarily relied on the founding Treaties of the European Community and the 
ECJ’s jurisprudence to build the Charter. Since the Charter was to be included in the Union’s 
primary law, and would be enforced by the ECJ, these facts are unsurprising. 
Delegates also heavily relied on the ECHR in the drafting process. The final draft Charter 
often quotes the ECHR word for word in provisions pertaining to basic individual rights, certain 
family rights, political rights, and judicial rights.312 At times the IGC modernized the ECHR’s 
language, but retained their same meaning— for instance in educational, cultural, and certain 
family rights.313 In some family rights’ provisions the only language change between the ECHR 
and the Charter was the promotion of gender equality through a modern set of pronouns. The 
delegates used the UDHR only in the Charter’s first Article. 
In the area of socio-economic rights,314 participants used the Council of Europe’s 
European Social Charter,315 the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 
                                                 
310 The European Council. “Roman Herzog: biography” Accessed last 23 April 2010 at 
http://www.ena.lu/biography_roman_herzog  
311 Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights: Note from the Praesidium. (Brussels: 11 October 2000). Accessed at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf on 23 March 2010. 
312 See Charter articles: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 28, 48, 49, and 50.  
313 See Charter articles: 8, 9, 11, 12, 17, 19, 47, and 52.  
314 See Charter articles: 15, 16, 17, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38 
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Workers (or the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights),316 and the secondary law of the 
European Union to fashion the Charter. These sources are less authoritative than the ECHR. The 
European Social Charter is only partially binding317 while the Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights is only declaratory.318 The secondary law of the European Union is legally enforceable, 
and thus holds a stronger legal basis. However, the EU’s secondary law lacks the visibility and 
moral legitimacy of the Social Charters.  
The IGC therefore had a wider set of international sources from which to draw the 
Charter than the Council of Europe. This is also unsurprising as there are over four decades of 
international treaty-making in between the 1999-2000 IGC and the Coucnil of Europe’s 1950-
1951 meetings.319 
 
iii. The symbols 
 
During the Convention, participants communicated about the value of a treaty provision 
by relating its language to the relationships between pre-existing European institutions, ideas of 
legitimacy, the visibility of individual rights, and the normative values common to democracies.  
                                                                                                                                                             
315 European Social Charter (revised). (Strasbourg: 3 May 1996). Accessed last on 24 March 2010 at:  
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/TreatiesIndex_en.asp  A general overview provided 
by the Council of Europe is available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/PresentationIndex_en.asp. Accessed last on 24 
March 2010. 
316 The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (Brussels: 9 December 1989) Accessed last at 
http://www.aedh.eu/The-Community-Charter-of.html. on 24 March 2010. A legislative summary made by the 
Commission can be found at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/c10107_en.htm. 
Accessed last on 24 March 2010. 
317 Only 7 of 20 articles of the Social Charter are considered to create international obligations on signatory states.  
318 Article 27 of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. 
319 See Chapter II pp 43-45 
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The major questions facing the Convention officials were: 1) what is the relationship of 
this charter to the ECHR? 2) What rights are fundamental and how are they defined? And 3) 
what mechanism best protects fundamental individual rights? 
When representatives addressed the question of the Charter’s relationship to the ECHR, 
they used arguments that portrayed the Charter as either equivalent or stronger than the ECHR. 
However, the representatives consistently assumed that any Charter should not detract from the 
ECHR’s protections, but expand them. The delegates also used language that reflected the 
ECtHR’s and the ECJ’s inherent institutional separation. 
When delegates addressed the substantive questions of what rights to include, and what 
extent to include rights they assumed that the whole of the ECHR would be included. Delegates 
used arguments over the normative value of expanding the scope or number of the ECHR’s 
rights. By invoking the secondary source of the ECHR, delegates justified their values by 
connecting them to a socially legitimated external source.  
When addressing the Charter’s substance discussants also relied on commonly held 
normative values to justify their arguments. These values are: promoting European cultural 
diversity, European regional integration, individual rights’ visibility, democratic principles, 
updating the rights of the ECHR, updating the rights of the UDHR, updating the rights in the 
European Union treaties, updating the rights of other international treaties, principles of 
legitimate authority, and finally the intelligibility of the ECJ and the ECtHR’s jurisdictional 
boundaries. These values on the whole primarily use language of value-added processes— 
updating rights, promoting diversity, promulgating individual rights. The exception in these 
symbols' language is the intelligibility of the ECJ and ECtHR’s jurisdictional boundaries, which 
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inherently promotes the identifiable separation of its subjects. This will be shown to reflect how 
the regional courts’ jurisdictions were used in argument. 
For the most part, when delegates addressed the enforcement mechanism of the draft 
Charter, they assumed the Charter would be legal. Some outliers argued against a legally binding 
treaty using the potential overlapping jurisdictions of an ECJ-enforced Charter and the ECtHR as 
their justification. However these arguments were either marginalized or ignored by other actors. 
The language of the symbol therefore reflects the usage of the symbol. Both were negative and 
both were ignored. This will be shown more concretely below. 
 
B. The deliberations 
 
The deliberations of the Intergovernmental Convention were groundbreaking in their 
transparency. Publishing working documents on the internet as they were created and used, the 
Convention used new information technology to legitimize the creation of the Charter by 
revealing all of its mundane and boring details. Unfortunately, because these details were 
mundane and boring, they are no longer kept on the European Union’s servers. The only 
exceptions are the various NGO contributions prior to the Convention’s meeting, commentaries 
by the chairpersons, explanations of the provisions by the Convention, a plethora of links to the 
Charter’s source material, and a maddening labyrinth of links between bureaucracies that, though 
they all refer to the location of the Conventions’ working papers, functionally lead nowhere.320  
 However, since there do exist a good deal of non-state contributions to the Convention, 
one can identify how non-state actors’ identity- and interest-formation process functioned during 
                                                 
320 My November-December 2009 emails to the Parliamentary offices that govern public access to EU documents, 
which request access to this information, haven’t been replied to in any form, though the addresses are correct in 
multiple web locations. 
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the IGC. And although these contributions won’t necessarily reflect how the most influential 
participants from the EU and the member states processed information during interactions inside 
the Convention, it can identify some general social trends that surrounded the Convention. These 
general trends can inform our understanding of the European social realities that surrounded the 
Charter’s creation. 
 
 This section is divided into two subsections. The first conducts a statistical analysis of 50 
of the non-state contributions to the Intergovernmental Convention that drafted and finalized the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.321 It correlates the symbols that an actor used to its 
argumentative intent to identify who used what symbol in what way. The second subsection 
relates these correlations to the Conventions’ explanations of the final draft Charter.322  
The first subsection finds that dissent over the Charter’s fundamental features was 
generally ignored. While corporate entities consistently invoked the need to keep the ECJ’s and 
the ECtHR’s jurisdictional boundaries intelligible as an argument against a legally binding 
charter, social NGO’s, individuals, and unions consistently invoked the normative value of 
increasing rights’ visibility and expanding pre-existing treaties to promote the inclusion of 
certain socio-economic rights. 
 The second subsection finds that the Convention justified the Charter’s provisions by 
aligning them to pre-legitimated, European institutions. It aligned the Charter’s enforcement 
mechanism with an internal perception of the European developmental process that had been 
taken for granted by external contributors. 
                                                 
321 A sample of a third of the total contributions. This sample is drawn with the intent of capturing the range of actor 
s (individual, NGO, union, businesses) and follows particularly those who express opinions about socio-economic 
rights and legal enforceability. 
322 Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights: Note from the Praesidium. (Brussels: 11 October 2000). Accessed last 25 
April 2010 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf 
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i. Deliberative consensus 
I. Non-state contributions 
Unlike the deliberations in the Council of Europe, the Charter’s Intergovernmental 
Convention did not take the pre-existing consensus for granted. While conflict did occur within 
and around the Convention, the conflict was over marginal issues of provisions’ wording. The 
fundamental structure of the Charter was accepted from the outset by all but a few participants. 
Although these few challenged the others, their arguments were mostly written off and ignored. 
When a few contributors did respond to these dissidents, they either dismantled the dissents’ 
arguments and then engaged the majority or engaged the majority and addressed the dissent as a 
side thought. How these contributors interact with the dissent show that the IGC’s actors 
generally agreed on the basic structure of the Charter. This basic structure then reflects their 
construction of the Court’s identity. 
 This subsection presents a statistical analysis of 50 non-state contributions.323 The dataset 
for the analysis comes from the Parliament’s public databases and was analyzed using Microsoft 
Excel and SPSS.324 The analysis codes non-state contributions based on the nature of the actor, 
the number and types of proposals these actors made, whether or not the contribution regards 
socio-economic rights or the legal enforcement of the Charter, and the symbols or justificatory 
logics that the contributions employed in their arguments. It then correlates these variables and 
identifies areas of significance. (Data, See Diagram 9) 
This analysis codes data first by what type of actor produced the contribution. It finds 
five categories of actors: Individuals, social NGO’s, Unions, and Businesses. Examples of actors 
in these categories are (respectively) university professors, the Association of Southern-
                                                 
323 European Parliament. “Contributions forwarded to the Convention” Accessed last 24 April 2010 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/civil/civil0_en.htm  
324 Ibid.  
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European Women (Association des Femmes De L’Europe Méridionale), the Media Industrial 
Union (Industriegewerkschaft Medien), and the Bass Hotels & Resorts (Bass PLC). NGO’s 
contributed most often to the Convention, submitting 37 contributions. (See Diagram 10) 
The actors’ contributions are then coded by number and type of proposals made. The 50 
actors made 147 proposals in two categories: substance and process. 102 proposals related to the 
substance of the Charter’s rights, and 45 related to the Convention process. (See Diagram 11)  
The analysis then codes the substantive proposals based on whether the actor argued for 
or against a legal Charter (17 for, 3 against; see Diagram 12) and whether the proposals argued 
for the inclusion or exclusion of socio-economic rights (14 for, 2 against; see Diagram 13). 
The analysis then codes contributions based on the socially constructed symbols they 
employ to justify their substantive arguments.325 These symbols are European cultural diversity, 
European regional integration, individual rights’ visibility, democratic principles, updating the 
ECHR, updating the UDHR, updating European Union treaties, updating other international 
treaties, principles of legitimate authority, and finally the overlap of the ECtHR’s and the ECJ’s 
jurisdictions. The study finds that contributors invoked these symbols 82 times in 130 different 
logical arguments on the substance of individual rights. (See Diagram 14, 15) The number of 
symbols, arguments, and proposals differ from each other because often contributors used a 
single symbol to make multiple arguments that resulted in multiple proposals.  
The findings of the data analysis show that NGO’s used arguments of visibility 
significantly more often than other actors (See Diagram 16).326 Businesses used the symbol of an 
ECJ-ECtHR jurisdiction dispute as a legitimate argument more often than other non-state actors. 
                                                 
325 When participants communicated about the Convention process as a whole they invoked procedural rather 
than substantive symbols. The primary procedural symbol used in non-state contributions was the normative value 
of a transparent Convention. This study does not analyze procedural arguments as participants typically made them 
tangentially to substantive arguments.   
326 Significant at < 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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However, this finding is ambiguous due to the low frequency (5) of the symbol’s usage (See 
Diagram 17). Actors who argued using the symbol of European integration were more likely to 
also use democratic principles, and the expansion of the ECHR’s rights as justifications for their 
arguments. (See Diagram 18)327  
These data show that non-state actors did not consider the potential overlap of the ECJ 
and the ECtHR to be problematic. Instead, they discussed the substance of rights using other 
common concepts to make their points. When a non-state actor did employ these two 
institutions’ overlapping jurisdictions as a reason to make the Charter non-legal, other non-state 
actors either negated it or didn’t reply. Non-state actors therefore generally agreed that the 
enforcement mechanism of the Charter should be legal, and should include some set of socio-
economic rights. The questions addressed by non-state actors were questions of the charter’s 
wording, not its structure. 
                                                 
327 The correlations of these variables are each severally significant at < 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Individual NGO Union Business Total 
 n % tot n % tot n % tot n % tot n % tot 
N 2 4% 37 74% 6 12% 5 10% 50 100% 
Total 












Process 0 0% 34 75.56% 3 6.67% 8 17.78% 45 
100% 
Economic328 0 0% 7 50% 5 35.71% 1 7.14% 14 100% 
Non-
Economic 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 100% 2 
100% 
Legal 
Enforcement 2 11.1% 15 83.33% 1 5.56% 0 0% 18 
100% 
Non-legal 




Diversity  1 8.3% 9 75% 1 8.3% 1 8.3% 12 100% 
Integration 0 0% 7 63.63% 1 14.29% 3 28.58% 11 100% 
Visibility 0 0% 13 92.85% 0 0% 1 7.15% 14 100% 
ECHR 1 14.29% 5 71.43% 1 20% 0 0% 7 100% 
UDHR 0 0% 5 100% 0 0% 0 0% 5 100% 
EU 
jurisprudence 0 0% 4 100% 0 0% 0 0% 4 100% 
Other Treaties 0 0% 6 85.71% 0 0% 1 14.29% 7 100% 
Democratic 
Principles 0 0% 6 85.71% 1 14.29% 0 0% 7 100% 
Legitimacy 0 0% 7 70% 2 20% 1 10% 10 100% 
ECtHR-ECJ 




- 40% 0 0% 2 40% 5 100% 
 
                                                 
328 i.e. The Actor advocated for the inclusion of economic rights, such as social security, into the charter’s language. 
329 In the documents of the NGOs’ two denied the validity of the argument that the jurisdictional conflict between 
the ECtHR and the ECJ would be detrimental to the European human rights regime, while one accepted it. I identify 
the NGO’s usages as positive or negative here, but analyzed the data as an absolute value (i.e. with a value of 3 
rather than -1). Note that one of these negative usages was made by an UN-based NGO, Marangopoulos, which 
provided full support for the document produced by the AFEM (Association of Women of Southern Europe). I think 
technically it is a repetition of the argument, but it seems weaker than a restatement. 
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Diagram 10. Contributions by Actor 
 























































Diagram 12. Substantive Proposals by Actor and Preferred Enforcement Mechanism 
 







































Diagram 14. Actor Symbol Usage  
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Diagram 16. Correlation between NGO and Visibility Usage 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ngo .71 .457 52 
Visibility .27 .448 52 
 
Correlations 
 ngo Visibility 
Pearson Correlation 1 .327* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .012 
ngo 
N 58 58 
Pearson Correlation .327* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .012  
Visibility 
N 58 58 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Diagram 17. Correlation between Business and ECtHR/ECJ’s Jurisdiction 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
business .10 .298 52 






Pearson Correlation 1 .151 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .286 
business 
N 52 52 
Pearson Correlation .151 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .286  
ECtHR jurisdiction 




Diagram 18. Correlation between Integration, The Rights of the ECHR, and Democratic 
Principles 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Integration .23 .469 52 
Update ECHR .17 .430 52 
Democratic  .13 .345 52 
 
Correlations 
 Integration Update ECHR Democratic  
Pearson Correlation 1 .381** .289* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .005 .038 
Integration 
N 52 52 52 
Pearson Correlation .381** 1 -.160 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005  .257 
Update ECHR 
N 52 52 52 
Pearson Correlation .289* -.160 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .038 .257  
Democratic  
N 52 52 52 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
II. The Conventions’ explanations 
 
The fact that non-state actors argued over the wording of the Charter rather than its 
structure does not prove the existence of the same internal consensus inside the Convention. This 
subsection shows that this was indeed the case by examining the explanations for the Charter’s 
provisions expressed by the Convention.330  
The Convention’s explanations of the Charter’s provision utilize symbols that align with 
the bulk of non-state actors’ justificatory arguments. Therefore, the Conventions’ justifications 
for the Charter require similar preconceptions of the European regional political structures, and 
similar definitions for the symbols that can describe it. The following two sections describe how 
                                                 
330 Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights: Note from the Praesidium. (Brussels: 11 October 2000). Accessed last 25 
April 2010 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf  
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the Convention justified the number and scope of its rights and the jurisdictional structure for the 
ECJ to apply the Charter. 
 
a. Substance of rights 
 
The Convention justified the Charter’s provisions by founding them on pre-existing 
sources. Primarily, the Convention invoked the Union’s primary or secondary law as interpreted 
by the ECJ. Community-based laws are used to justify 76% of the Charter’s substantive 
provisions (38 of 50).331 The Convention supplemented these justifications by referring the 
Charter’s provisions to the ECHR’s rights. 36 percent of the Charter’s substantive rights 
provisions are justified in this way (18 of 50).332 In the area of socio-economic rights, the 
Convention supplemented Community-law based justifications with either of the European 
Social Charters.333 In a few instances, the Convention also invoked the constitutional traditions 
of European Union member states or other common international treaties to justify a 
provision.334 The convention used the rights of the UDHR once, to justify the first Article.335 
Therefore, the Convention defined the Charter’s rights by contextualizing them to the 
region’s pre-existing human rights institutions. By focusing on laws made within the Union and 
the Council of Europe, the Convention labeled these institutions as the main human rights 
institutions in Europe. Thus the IGC perceived that the Charter was to expand the European 
Union as an equal in the field of human rights to the Council of Europe. It therefore assumed that 
                                                 
331 Ibid at Articles: 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 
43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, and 52. 
332 Ibid. at Articles: 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 19, 28, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 52. 
333 Ibid at Articles: 12, 14, 15, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35.  
334 Ibid at Articles: 3 (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, ICC Statute), 14 (national constitutions), 24 
(New York Convention on the Rights of the Child), and 49(national constitutions and the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights). 
335 Ibid at Article 1. “Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.” 
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the ECJ would also act as an equal with the ECtHR. This assumption requires the Convention to 
believe that either both institutions can and will co-operate with each other, or that both 
institutions can and will find a way to co-operate. 
 
b. Enforcement mechanisms 
 
The IGC’s decision to make the Charter legally enforceable reiterates and adds to the 
Convention’s conception of the ECJ as a co-operative court. Articles 51-53 of the Charter deal 
with the Charter’s scope and application in the ECJ.336 The Convention’s explanations of these 
three articles justify the provisions by invoking the institutional relationships of the ECHR, the 
EU, and the member states. In doing so, the Convention defines what a proper organization of 
human rights institutions looks like to the Convention. 
First, the Convention establishes that Article 51, “Scope,” applies the Charter primarily to 
actions of the EU institutions and Community law. The Convention sees the Charter as 
applicable to states only insofar as states act under community law.337 
Second, the IGC’s explanation of Articles 52 “Scope of guaranteed rights” permits 
member state law, the Charter, and the ECHR to protect different collections of rights provided 
that they all corresponded to the minimum set by the ECHR.338 Article 52 ties the Charter’s 
protection of human rights to the ECHR’s whenever the ECHR has a more protective collection 
of rights. Therefore when the ECtHR interprets a new right within the ECHR, the ECJ is 
obligated to do so within the Charter. The Convention justifies this tie as a necessary condition to 
                                                 
336 Article 54 does as well, but is a word-for-word inclusion of the non-self destructive clause in ECHR Article 17 
which disallows rights from being used to cancel out each other. 
337 Ibid. at Article 51, pp. 46-47 
338 Ibid. at Article 52 pp 47-49 
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provide legal consistency between the Charter and the ECHR where the ECtHR has expanded 
the ECHR’s rights.339 
Third, the Convention establishes that member states may have greater rights’ protection 
than the Charter in Article 53, “Level of protection.” The Charter therefore was meant to protect 
rights common to member states in conjunction with the ECtHR but not in opposition of more 




The Convention therefore conceived that the ECJ would enforce the Charter to protect rights 
greater than or equal the ECHR and less than or equal to member states’ human rights codes. 
However, the Convention also defined the Charter as unable to contract beyond its initial 
protection levels.341 This required the Convention to conceive of the Charter’s regional role in 
the as a supplement to the ECHR and to member state law.  
By not having the Charter replace these institutions, the Convention necessarily believed that 
all of these institutions could co-exist and protect individual rights together. The Convention, by 
defining the institutions’ relationships explicitly, implicitly believed the regional human rights 
                                                 
339 See in particular Article 52.3 “Insofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
[ECHR], the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.” 
340 Ibid at Article 53 p 49-50 
341 At the risk of abstracting the identity into nonsense:  
 
If:  ECHR=the protection level of the ECtHR (variable), and CF1= the Charter’s constituted protection level (a 
constant), and CF= the Charter’s functional protection level (variable), and MS= the protection level of EU 
member’s national law (variable); then: 
 
ECHR ≤ CF1 ≤ CF ≤ MS 
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institutions could fashion a functional organizational structure from clear definitions of the 
institutions’ relationships.  
C. Conclusions: the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The IGC that created the Charter was approached by a wider set of actors than the 
Council of Europe during the creation of the ECHR. The contributions of non-state actors show 
that a general consensus existed in Europe that believed the Charter ought to expand or match the 
ECHR and be legally enforceable. Any dissent over these identities were marginalized or 
ignored. This paper cannot say whether these facts are reiterated in the IGC’s internal 
deliberations.  
However, the IGC’s explanations for its final draft Charter reflected an approach based 
on adding together the rights of pre-existing treaties into a single document. By not replacing 
pre-existing treaties, the Convention constructed the Charter as a supplemental institution rather 
than an overarching institution. 
Further, the Convention’s explanations don’t take the legal enforcement of the Charter 
for granted. By linking the Charter to the ECHR and the member states’ collective constitutions, 
the Convention assumed that a legally enforceable Charter could coexist with other regional 
institutions if given a clear definition of their relationships.  
 
Non-state actors wielded symbols of positive expansion to influence the internal 
deliberations of the IGC. Actors wielding symbols of negative or static expansion were undercut 
by other contributors. The IGC described its final document using symbols of pre-existing legal 
structures to expand the European regional human rights regime from within.  
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Therefore the telos of the Court that these actors assumed was to expand the protection of 
European human rights in cooperation with the ECtHR and the EU’s member states. 
 
iii. What it does and what it is: comparing the ECJ’s functional and constitutive teli 
 
European individuals, ECJ judges, the EU’s organs, and national governments 
approached the ECJ as a supranational court with limited competences. Wielding the direct effect 
and the supremacy doctrine the Court defined its role within the European legal structure as the 
head of a monist hierarchy in a narrow area of law. Member states challenged this conception, 
and eventually complied with the Court’s monist framework. This narrow, monist legal authority 
was the Court’s internally identified telos.  
Individuals, non-state organizations, the European organs, and national governments and 
parliaments approached the 1999-2000 IGC to expand human rights protection in the European 
region. Wielding additive symbols, these actors redefined the Court’s role within the wider 
European legal structure as a member of a collective human rights regime. This wide, 
supplementary legal authority was the Court’s externally identified telos. 
The Court’s two teli are therefore currently divergent. The ECJ’s functional telos defines 
itself as a regional hegemon in a small area of law. The ECJ’s constitutional telos defines it as a 
regional partner in a large area of law.  
This divergence of the ECJ’s identity likely reflects the region’s attempt to internally 
understand the meaning of the EU’s institutional convergence on the Council of Europe. The 
Court recognized the ECtHR during its functioning as a regional counterpart, but kept its 
distance by restricting itself to its areas of competence. Now, however, the member states have 
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forced the ECJ to interact with the ECtHR on human rights issues. How the ECJ will internally 
adjust will likely define the future of the European human rights regime. 
 
This chapter has shown the diverging externally and internally defined purposes of the 
ECJ. By examining the development of the direct effect and supremacy doctrines it showed that 
the Court internally defined itself at the head of a narrow monist legal framework. By examining 
the justifications of non-state and the IGC’s proposals to the Charter this chapter illustrated that 
external actors define the Court as a supplemental jurisdiction within the collective legal 
structures of the European region. Chapter IV concludes this paper by relating this chapter on the 
ECJ to Chapter III on the ECtHR and developing a prediction for the future of the European 




Chapter IV. How they relate: the European human rights regime today 
 
The European human rights regime is marked today by the entanglement of two formerly 
parallel institutions and their jurisdictions. The first is the ECtHR, an intergovernmental court 
built on a broad European consensus that slowly expanded its jurisdiction into member state 
sovereignty in the area of human rights. The second is the ECJ, a supranational court with 
limited competences that operated in a monist legal hierarchy.  
The promulgation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2009 caused the ECJ to 
converge on the ECtHR. The Charter established an EU human rights regime that supplemented 
the ECHR with principles taken from the European Social Charters and the EU’s legislation. The 
Charter externally redefined the ECJ’s identity. Now, the ECJ and the European region will have 
to come to grips with this identity if the European human rights regime is to have clear 









Non-EU, CoE MS 
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This concluding chapter first synthesizes Chapters II and III. It then makes a prediction 




Chapter II examined the internal and external identity-formation processes of the ECtHR. 
It examined the creation of the ECHR in the Council of Europe and the Court’s jurisprudence to 
conclude that the ECtHR is a complementary jurisdiction that has gradually expanded its 
authority in the region. 
 Individuals approached the Council of Europe with the intention of creating a human 
rights body that granted individual access. When the United Nations failed to enact this body on 
a global scale, the Council of Europe built the institution on a regional scale. Delegates 
interacted with each other by debating over the definition of symbols fundamentally tied into that 
moment’s regional-global relationship. When consensus was found, these delegates constructed a 
court that protected only those rights common to all Council of Europe members. They 
constrained the Court with intergovernmental mechanisms and language, but intentionally left 
the ECHR’s language vague to allow for gradual expansion. 
 Individuals have increasingly relied on the ECtHR to protect their individual rights 
against their governments’ actions. Judges developed the margin of appreciation doctrine and its 
proportionality tests. In the process they constructed an internal identity of the ECtHR as a 
complementary jurisdiction that is deferential to member states in broad areas of social morality. 
The Court has begun gradually narrowing its deference to states through the proportionality tests, 




 Chapter III examined the internal and external identity-formation process of the ECJ. It 
examined the Court’s jurisprudence and the contributions to and from the 1999-2000 IGC to 
conclude that the Court internally identifies itself as the head of a narrow monist legal 
framework while the regional externally redefined the Court as a supplemental jurisdiction 
within the broader collective human rights legal framework. 
 Individuals, EU organs, and member states have relied on the ECJ to define the EU’s 
relationship to individuals and states. Judges developed the supremacy and direct effect doctrines 
and constructed an internal identity of the Court as an overarching jurisdiction at the head of a 
narrow monist framework. Not only did the ECJ procedurally co-opt national courts to apply a 
wide breadth of community law, but it subsumed national constitutions’ substance to even 
marginal community legislation. The ECJ has firmly established that, where the treaties provide 
competence, the Court has to have final jurisdictional authority.  
 Delegates from the EU, member state governments, and national parliaments entered the 
IGC with a large dossier of external opinion. Non-state actor’s contributions to these dossiers 
expressed a general European consensus on fundamental questions of the Charter. By debating 
over certain socio-economic rights’ inclusion and scope, the delegation did not believe that a 
debate over the Charter’s enforcement mechanisms was necessary. The IGC justified the Charter 
as the codification of the region’s historically expanding individual rights. It explicitly linked the 
Charter to the regional human rights regime by defining the Charter’s relationships with pre-
existing institutions. The 1999-2000 IGC identified the Court as a supplemental member of a 




 These two Chapters expressed how European actors perceived and understood the 
ontological realities of the European region after World War II through a regional legal system. 
The construction and functioning of the ECJ and the ECtHR were constrained and empowered 
by those identities that individuals, states, and international institutions had imbued the courts. 
Chapter II shows that the ECtHR is constrained from rapid human rights expansion by its 
intergovernmental identity- but is empowered by its longstanding legitimacy. Chapter III shows 
that the ECJ’s internal supranational identity easily expands into member state authority in a 
narrow area of law- but is supposed to supplement rather than replace the human rights 
jurisdictions of the ECtHR and EU member states. Both  Chapters showed that these identities 
were created from processes that defined relationships between structures that co-exist on the 




 Now that the Lisbon treaty has expanded the EU into human rights law, where will the 
European human rights regime go?  
This paper keeps its predictions narrow. It concentrates on the short to mid-term future 
(the next 2 to 5 years), primarily because this study does not capture the number of variables 
necessary for a mid- to long-term prediction. To make its prediction, this section first delineates 
the set of potential resolutions. It weighs their merits, and advances the most plausible future. 
  
 The first possible but rather unsatisfying resolution is the dissolution of the EU. The 
current financial crisis in Greece and impending crises in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the Balkan 
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states threatens to fundamentally undermine the Union’s legitimacy and aggravate national 
euroskepticism in the founding states.342 However, the potential of the economic situation 
spilling over into the human rights institutions is offset by the general trust that European 
citizens have in both the human rights regime and the EU’s institutional adaptability. It is more 
likely that the EU would reduce its membership or its economic integration than completely fall 
apart.343  
The second possible resolution is the absorption of the ECtHR by the EU. This would 
place the ECtHR within the EU’s monist framework, most likely above the ECJ. However, this is 
impossible because of the non-EU member states who are members of the Council of Europe. 
Unless these states are removed from the ECtHR’s jurisdiction they would have to be added to 
the ECJ’s jurisdiction. If the Council of Europe or the EU’s memberships are not reset, the 
ECtHR would have to construct a dual identity to become incorporated in the EU. The last 
decades’ expansion patterns of the EU and the inherent schizophrenia required to make these 
propositions work preclude the viability of combining the ECtHR and the ECJ’s jurisdictions. 
 The third possible resolution is the maintenance of the organizational status quo. Actors 
could construct a new symbol to represent how the Courts’ relationship functions leave the ECJ 
to internalize its exogenous identity. Such a symbol would have a good deal of case law in both 
jurisdictions to rely on.344 However, scholarship and member state opinion focus on how the 
European Union regionalizes formerly national authorities and undergoes state-like 
                                                 
342 This is currently stabilized as a relatively minor opinion. See European Commission. “Standard Eurobarometer 
72” (Brussels: the European Commission, December 2009) p.34 accessed last 26 April 2010 at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_en.htm 
343 Though, the EU may go the other direction and create a stronger bureaucracy to control interest rates and member 
state debt. Perhaps a bank comparable to the Federal Reserve will be created to provide emergency relief in the case 
of a potential member state default. This is all speculation, obviously. 
344 See for example, in the ECJ: Case 4/73 Nold v. Commission [1974] ECR 491, and Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava 
Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications, Ireland [1996] ECR I-3953;  
and, in the ECtHR: Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland Judgment of 30 June 2005, 
Application 45036/98, X,Y, and Z v. United Kingdom Judgment of 20 March 1997, 581 ECR 667. 
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constitutional processes. This indicates that most delegates believe it unacceptable to settle for 
ambiguous institutional structures for very long. European actors will define when the ECJ 
defers to the ECtHR by constructing a symbol to reflect this definition but the status quo of the 
courts’ overlapping jurisdictions will not remain for very long. 
 The fourth possible resolution is that the EU and the ECJ subordinate itself to the ECtHR 
in a monist human rights hierarchy. The ECJ in this view will maintain its supremacy in areas of 
the Union’s sole competences, but will be subordinate to the ECtHR in the areas of the ECtHR’s 
competence. The ECJ will refer cases that pertain to the ECHR to the ECtHR, and will 
adjudicate community cases itself. 
The identities found in this study seem to indicate its validity. Europe has regional 
identified itself as on the forefront of global human rights regimes. The ECtHR has expressed a 
desire to expand its regional role. The EU has expressed a desire to make human rights more 
visible by pushing for the Union’s accession to the ECHR. The ECJ has established itself as the 
head of a narrow monism. Member states of the Council of Europe and the European Union have 
expressed generally their acceptance of gradually increasing rates of expansion in the protection 
of human rights. Finally, individual Europeans have increasingly relied on both institutions to 
protect their rights from governmental interference but are wary of overly rapid regional 
integration. 
 
This study therefore finds that the EU will first accede to the ECHR. Then, the ECJ will 
define the ECtHR’s jurisdiction in the language of its narrow legal monism and construct a 
doctrine to reflect this definition. The ECJ will then defer to the ECtHR’s supremacy in the 
ECtHR’s area of competence while maintaining its own supremacy over national courts in its 
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sole competences. Most likely, the doctrine that the ECJ constructs to dictate when and how this 
deference occurs will incorporate concepts developed in the application of the direct effect and 
supremacy doctrines.  
The ECtHR will not likely need to construct any major doctrine to accept cases from the 
ECJ. But it will accept cases whenever it can. The ECtHR may attempt to use the EU’s accession 
and the subsequent influx of EU cases to justify a greater judicial activism in the ECtHR. 
However the ECtHR is constrained by the actions of the non-EU members of the Council of 
Europe, and their reactions to an EU accession will inform the ECtHR’s behavior.345  
Once the Lisbon treaty institutionally pans out and once the economic crisis is resolved, 
whatever EU member states are left will need some time to settle before regaining public 
motivation for further integration or expansion. Member states will only allow EU expansion 
into those states that the EU perceives as eventually becoming net-payers. If there is any 
opposition from Council of Europe member states to the activity of the ECtHR it will likely 
come from outside of the European Union. 
Individuals in European states will use the Charter to engage their governments within 
community courts, and will begin to engage the Union in the ECtHR. Should individuals 
perceive that the human rights regime of the European Union and the European region can fully 
protect their rights, they may begin to identify with the concept of a European citizenship. 
Should individuals identify with a regional European identity, they may begin to accept the 
concept of a fully supranational Europe. While some commentators may already claim that the 
supranationalization of Europe’s social identity has begun, this commentator does not think that 
the EU has passed the point of no return. 
                                                 
345 The recent foreign policy taken by Russia when it delayed protocol 14’s ratification does not bode well for this 
proposition, but I am fairly certain that the judges, individuals, and the structures of the ECtHR are already 
internally reacting to Russia’s actions. 
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The ECJ, the ECtHR, the EU, the Council of Europe, European states, and European 
individuals all continue to have the ability to wield symbols and reconstruct their definition of 
the European human rights regime. In the past they have expanded the human rights regime by 
building structures to support its growth and trimming areas that get overgrown. They are likely 
to continue to do so in the future. How these agents choose to separate the entangling limbs 
fundamentally rests on where they put the trellis and how they wield the shears. Hopefully, 
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